ࡱ> _]XY`!` Ѕbjbj\\ 1>> d&   &   AAA8.B4bCt ݈8CC"DDDEE E\^^^^^^$h} eEEee DDWyWyWye D D\Wye\WyWy6| DC A}h\d0݈x-n 8 dE< PWyYlq_\EEExEEE݈eeee *r8 r8  can you see my parents? A childrens-rights perspective on the legal recognition of lesbian and gay relationships Heidi Yates( Historically, public debate over recognition of lesbian and gay relationships has focused on the rights and interests of adults who wish to have their long-term commitment to a same-sex partner recognised and protected under law. However, there is a valuable contribution to be made to the relationship-recognition debate from the perspective of children parented by same-sex couples. Evidence collected from polls and clinical encounters suggests that approximately twenty percent of lesbians and gay men currently have children and that many more same-sex couples intend to parent children in the future. The 2001 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census reported that 37,800 Australians were cohabiting in same-sex de facto relationships and that children were present in eleven percent of same-sex de facto households. The ABS has acknowledged that these figures are likely to substantially under-represent the number of Australians in same-sex de facto relationships, as this was only the second census to count same-sex couples. This evidence indicates that there are significant and increasing numbers of Australian children who live in same-sex de facto households where they derive love, care and support from their lesbian and gay parents on a day-to-day basis. It is my central objective in this paper to highlight the experience of children whose rights are diminished whenever lawmakers refuse to recognise a childs relationship with both of his or her parents and the parents relationships with one other. At the time of writing, the Commonwealth Government is in the initial stages of rolling out the most significant reforms to the family law system in 30 years. A central aim of the reforms are to move the focus of family law from the rights of parents to the best interests of children. However, in the first part of this paper I critique the best-interests principle the dominant concept in law relating to children for the past century and contract it with an emerging childrens-rights approach to lawmaking. After discussing the indeterminacy of the best-interests principle, I argue that a childrens-rights framework, informed by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, promotes lawmaking which can respond to the realistic needs of children rather than the idealistic agendas of external interest groups. I then use a rights framework to examine how Australian state, territory and commonwealth legislation protects childrens rights in the context of their families. Here, I examine how the State uses legislative measures to construct family by imposing parental responsibility upon certain adults by virtue of their biological or social relationship to a particular child. In Australia, the State continues to rely heavily upon opt-in mechanisms of marriage and adoption to create family units where parents are responsible for upholding their childrens rights to care and protection. However, by recognising family relationships outside a marital context, presumptive de facto and parenting legislation now secures some rights for children independently of parental choice. At present, restricted access to opt-in recognition measures and piecemeal coverage by presumptive legislation have created a situation where the extent to which a childs rights are protected depends on the marital status and/or sexual orientation of his or her parents and the jurisdiction in which the family lives. In response to this finding, I argue that a genuine commitment to children requires the State to broaden existing concepts of family to ensure that childrens rights and interests are upheld in all familial circumstances, regardless of the gender or marital status of their parents. Finally, I seek to evaluate and recommend a series of practical measures which federal, state and territory governments could implement to achieve this goal and better fulfil Australias international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child. I look in particular at the possibility of creating a federal model based on Tasmanias innovative Relationships Act 2003. 1. A theoretical framework FOR RECOGNISING 鱨վs interests This part compares the utility of a best-interests approach with a childrens-rights approach to securing childrens interests in a legislative context. The best interests principle formerly the welfare principle has been the central concept in law relating to children for the past century. The principle requires that the best-interests of a child be the paramount consideration in decisions which impact childrens lives, such as where they will live and with whom they will have contact on a day-to-day basis. Because the law most often deals with children in the context of their families, legislation and case law around the world direct judicial decision-makers to invoke the best-interests principle. Further, lawmakers frequently justify family-oriented laws by referring to what is in the best interests of all children. Whilst the best interests principle may initially appear attractive, I wish to critique its application in legal policy decisions about children. I argue that far from upholding the welfare of children, a best-interests approach allows the focus of law-making to shift from the children concerned to the idealistic agendas of specific interest groups. In this context, I refer to idealism as a force which manipulates the development of laws relating to children so that such laws promote and reinforce specific political or social objectives such as the heterosexual nuclear family to the detriment of children who live in a broad range of families, including those led by same-sex couples. Inspired by the work of legal theorists Freeman and Eekelaar, I advocate a childrens-rights approach to law-making about children. I propose that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Australia in December 1990, provides a determinate human-rights framework in which lawmakers can consider the needs and interests of children. Provided it is informed and constrained by a rights context, I argue it is possible to revive the best-interests principle as a productive mechanism to help determine which available option will best uphold a particular right or set of rights for children generally. A. The best-interests principle The requirement that a decision-maker give consideration to the best interests of the child appears in legislation across the world including the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, the USA, India and Africa. This principle is also familiar in Australian domestic law. The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) requires a court to regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration when making a parenting order dealing with a childs residence; a childs contact with his or her parents or other persons; the maintenance of a child; or any other aspect of parental responsibility. The best-interests principle has tremendous symbolic appeal because it focuses directly upon the child. Where a childs interests are paramount they outweigh other values or interests, such as those of parents or wider society more generally, which may otherwise inform a courts or lawmakers decision. However, for the sake of accountability and transparency, the decision-making processes of judges and lawmakers must be determinate to ensure that decisions are more than a subjective, random pattern of outcomes. Elster argues that it is impossible for the best-interests principle to produce determinate outcomes, given the difficulties in identifying all the consequences which may flow from all options, the probability of each consequence occurring and the value which should be attached to each possible outcome. When determining a childs best interests, a decision-maker must ultimately refer to a private hierarchy of preferred outcomes to judge what he or she believes is best or ideal for the child in the circumstances. The crucial role of a decision-makers own value system in best-interests reasoning was acknowledged by Justice Brennan in 1992: [I]t must be remembered that, in the absence of legal rules or a hierarchy of values, the best-interests approach depends upon the value system of the decision-maker. Absent any rule or guidelines, that approach simply creates an unexaminable discretion in the repository of the power. The indeterminacy of the best-interests approach when applied to decisions about an individual child exposes the flaws of best-interests reasoning in lawmaking decisions that affect many children. It is impossible for lawmakers to determine accurately the probability and desirability of all possible outcomes for all children, with reference to a body of social norms and social experience. Thus, in a legislative context, a best-interests claim is more likely to be used as a politically expedient method to further the ideals or preferences of particular interest groups. As Fineman notes : Virtually everyonebegins by asserting that his or her position is the one which incorporates and represents the interests of children. Such assertions mean little. The best-interests of the child rhetoric obscures what is, in large part, a struggle among professional groups, special interest groups (particularly fathers rights advocates), and legal actors, over who controls both the substantive standards and the process and practice ofdecision making. One example of the best-interests principle being used to promote an ideal at the cost of childrens interests is judicial discrimination against lesbian and gay parents. In the United Kingdom, Reece has traced how the best-interests principle has been applied judicially to uphold the ideal of the nuclear family and repress deviations from this norm. She examines how the language of best-interests has been used to deprive children of the care of a lesbian or gay parent. In particular, courts who approach such children as in need of rescue from their family environment and have even awarded custody to a non-parent over a childs gay or lesbian parent in an effort to secure the child an ideal hetero-nuclear family. An example closer to home focuses on the debate which occurred in the ACT in 2003 over the Governments decision to remove discrimination against same-sex couples in relation to adoption. In this context, claims regarding the best interests of children were at the core of arguments made by those protesting the proposed amendments. They argued that adoption by a same-sex couple could never be in the best interests of a child given the large number of married, heterosexual couples available to provide adoptee children with an ideal family unit. Such arguments ignored the value of the amendments for children already parented by same-sex couples, who would now be able to have both their parents legally recognised. On its own, a best-interests approach lacks the framework necessary to ensure that childrens interests are not lost from view in the pursuit of objectives that are extraneous to childrens welfare. The law must respond to the day-to-day lives of children, rather than pursuing protection and support for ideal families. As Ettelbrick succinctly states: Where children exist and have begun to develop relationships with adults who are raising them as parents, it is too late to worry about whether the parents fit the ideal of family since the childrens interests rarely turn on ideals, but reality who feeds, clothes and loves them on a daily basis. It is thus necessary to look elsewhere for an approach to lawmaking which accounts for the interests of all children, whatever their familial circumstances. B. A childrens-rights approach to lawmaking Over the past two decades, many theorists have explored the notion that children hold a unique set of rights in addition to the human rights of all people. Since 1990, childrens rights have received overwhelming international recognition from a majority of countries around the world through ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Before examining the Convention more closely as a framework for law-making, I want to discuss some of the theory behind childrens rights to illuminate why a rights framework has the potential to re-focus lawmakers on the interests of children. i. 鱨վs rights in theory For legal theorists Freeman and Eekelaar, rights emanate from claims made by the rights holder for his or her interests to be recognised and protected. Eekelaar argues that thinking of children as potential makers-of-claims is essential in order for society to see them as autonomous individuals whose preferences and interests should be respected, just as those of other community members. Rights crystallise when the claims they represent are protected by the duties of others. Eekelaar differentiates between actions motivated by promoting the welfare of another a best-interests approach and actions which are consequential to recognising claims made by another a rights approach. He contends that giving a child the right to have another determine what is in his or her interests is no right at all, given that the primary right the claim-making power lies with the disinterested decision-maker. 鱨վ may lack the skills necessary to communicate what will best serve their interests, yet these limitations do not prevent agents from making claims on a childs behalf. However, Eekelaar emphasises that agents do not have free reign over childrens voices. Before acting, a substitute claim-maker must undertake a process where he or she listens to what children have to say, examines their social and cultural environments and seriously considers what children would want if they were fully-informed and mature. Freeman uses John Rawls theory of justice to illuminate how childrens rights may be identified at a theoretical level. In order to ask what rights children needor wantRawls would have us refer to the hypothetical original position where rational individuals debate what is just behind a veil of ignorance, without personal knowledge of their individual age, class, gender or sexual orientation. When no-one can control whether he or she will enjoy an ideal reality, there is an imperative for lawmakers to ensure that everyone has an equal right to access basic resources and opportunities - regardless of their starting position. Freeman promotes the position behind the veil of ignorance as the basis from which: [W]e must ask ourselves the question: from what actions and decisions would we wish, as children, to be protected, on the assumption that we would in due course desire to be rationally autonomous, capable of planning our lives and deciding on our own system of ends as rational beings? The language of rights has the potential to draw lawmakers away from the risks of best-interests paternalism which aims to do good to children towards a context where lawmakers and the community listen and respond to claims made by, or on behalf, of children. Thus, a rights approach to lawmaking has particular significance for children of same-sex couples and other non-traditional families whose minority voices can be hard to hear amid the growing fervour of religious and political idealism about the hetero-nuclear family. ii. 鱨վs rights in practice the United Nations Convention The drafters involved in the ten-year-planning process which culminated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter the Convention) aimed to codify a set of universal human-rights standards which were tailored specifically to children. The Convention embodies the notion that all children, regardless of nationality, religion, class or gender, are equal in dignity and worth and hold equal and inalienable rights as members of the human family. It articulates the fullest legal statement of childrens rights to be found anywhere and has been ratified by 191 countries all but Somalia and the USA. All ratifying states are required to report regularly to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, a body of independent international experts who monitor compliance with the Convention. As I will explain more fully below, the Convention identifies several rights which are particularly relevant to children in the context of same-sex parenting. Article 7 of the Convention gives a child the right to be registered after birth and the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. Article 27 recognises a childs right to a standard of living adequate for his or her physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development and confers upon parents the primary responsibility for securing such living conditions, with assistance from the State where necessary. Upon the breakdown of family units, Article 9 establishes a childs right to financial maintenance from, and ongoing contact with, both parents. These Articles highlight the central role of parents married or unmarried, opposite-sex or same-sex when it comes to protecting childrens rights. Despite frequent assertions that children have a right to a male and a female parent the Convention contains no explicit right to this effect. 鱨վs rights expert Tobin considers that nothing in the drafting history of the Convention indicates that the term parents should be limited to a man and a woman, or a childs biological parents. Tobin refers to statements from the Committee on the Rights of the Child to argue for a flexible definition of family which encompasses the many parenting arrangements which result from diverse social and cultural practices around the world. Accordingly, signatories to the Convention have an obligation to respect and uphold the rights of all children, without discrimination based on the marital status or sexual orientation of a childs parents. iii. Reviving the best-interests principle Although much debate has focused on a best-interests approach versus a rights approach, Tobin argues and I agree that the best-interests principle is a useful tool provided it is informed and constrained by the rights set down in the Convention: While the [best interests] principle remains a fluid and flexible concept, it is not unfettered or entirely subject to the personal whims of a decision-makera proposed outcome for a child cannot be said to be in his or her best-interests where it conflicts with the provisions of the Convention. Because another of the Conventions guiding principles is the right to participation, children must be given the opportunity to express their views in all matters that concern them. This process requires adults to surrender their tendency to interpret the best-interests principle by reference to their own expectations about family structure in favour of a child-centred approach informed by empirical evidence of the views of children. Overall, lawmaking in a childrens-rights framework has the potential to produce different outcomes from lawmaking based purely upon a best-interests approach. I acknowledge that switching from one to the other will not necessarily produce all the right answers. Nonetheless, in contrast to the indeterminacy of best-interests reasoning, the Convention points in particular directions and provides a determinate agenda for public debate. This, in turn, can move attention away from simply trying to weigh-up conflicting catch-all statements about childrens interests, to how and why groups arrive at divergent interpretations of particular rights. The Convention retains the best-interests principle but requires it to be interpreted in the context of a body of established rights. Such an approach, combined with a childs right to participate in decisions which concern them, provides a better prospect of promoting lawmaking that responds to the realistic needs of children, rather than the idealistic agendas of external interest groups. 2. 鱨վs rights and the legal Construction of family Australias ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990 was a powerful affirmation of the States role in recognising and protecting childrens rights. Throughout its forty substantive articles, the Convention emphasises the primary role of family in the upbringing and protection of children. Simultaneously, the Convention obliges ratifying States to assist families to fulfil this role through the provision of special benefits and services. As discussed above, childrens rights only exist where they are protected by the duties or obligations of others. This part explores how the State uses legislative measures to construct family by imposing specific responsibilities upon adults by virtue of their biological or functional parenting relationship with a particular child. Legal child-parent relationships offer children extensive rights-related benefits in a range of situations, including where family units breakdown due to parental separation. Current legislative policy reflects the States historical reliance on the opt-in institution of marriage to secure childrens rights in the context of the marital family. Yet a decline in Australias marriage rate and a rise in de facto relationships has compelled government policy towards presumptive legislation. By imposing legally-significant family structures upon couples without their explicit consent, presumptive measures preclude a parent from opting-out of obligations to care for and support their children. In the context of a limited welfare State, a presumptive approach to parental obligations is essential to ensuring a childs rights to care and an adequate standard of living. A. Identifying family legal recognition of child-parent relationships In Western societies, marriage is the traditional legal and social method of constituting family. Marriage laws establish and organise the family as a social institution; dictate the rights and responsibilities of parenthood; [and] determine the legal status of all progeny resulting from both natural and artificial insemination. Historically, the legal relationship between man and wife was fundamental to legal recognition of child-parent relationships. However, a growth in the number of children born outside the context of marriage has required policy-makers to re-think the laws approach to protecting childrens rights solely through regulation of the opt-in marital family. For its first fifteen years of operation, the Commonwealth Family Law Act 1975 (FLA) which establishes parental responsibility for children applied exclusively to children of married couples as the Government lacked the constitutional power to make laws with respect to non-marital children. However, between 1986 and 1990, all States except Western Australia made a formal referral to the Commonwealth of the powers necessary to extend the FLA to all children. It was agreed that because child-parent relationships no longer sat neatly within the opt-in marital framework, it would be desirable for parental responsibility to flow presumptively and uniformly on the basis of individual child-parent relationships.  This development removed legal discrimination against ex-nuptial children and reinforced parents primary responsibility for the financial costs associated with raising a child, with the aim of making social security a last resort for families in need. However, presumptive recognition of parental responsibility differs depending on whether a particular child is parented by a same-sex or opposite-sex couple. Discriminatory provisions at the state and federal level continue to deny children of same-sex couple rights in areas including birth registration, parental care and an adequate standard of living, as well as their specific rights to maintenance and contact upon the breakdown of the family unit. i. Who are the legal parents? Part VII of the FLA assigns responsibility for a child to his or her parents, consisting of all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children. Although the term parent is not explicitly defined in the FLA, it can be construed in context as referring to a childs biological mother and father. However, the FLA also recognises child-parent relationships which flow from adoption, or from a mans consent to father a child whom his female partner has conceived through an artificial conception procedure. Family Court parenting orders are an additional means through which responsibility for a childs general care, welfare and development can be conferred upon a particular adult. Given that it is only possible for one member of a lesbian or gay couple to be biologically related to their child, children of same-sex couples must rely on one or more of the following methods to obtain legal recognition of their non-biological co-parent. (a) Assisted reproductive technology presumptions A child conceived through the use of assisted reproductive technology may be genetically unrelated to either the birth mother or her partner, or only related to one of them. However, the FLA presumes that a woman who gives birth to a child is that childs legal parent. Further, if a womans husband or male de facto partner consents to her undergoing an artificial conception procedure, the man is also conclusively deemed to be the childs second legal parent. This is based on his pre-existing relationship with the childs mother and the couples intention to jointly parent the child. Only two jurisdictions in Australia the ACT and Western Australia legally recognise the co-parenting role of a womans female de facto partner. The Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) states that if a woman undergoes an artificial conception procedure with the consent of her domestic partner, that partner is conclusively presumed to be a parent of any child born as a result. Further, the ACT is the only Australian jurisdiction which provides for recognition of the parenting role of a mans same-sex de facto partner where their child is conceived through a non-commercial surrogacy agreement. Such recognition is not automatic but the couple is entitled to apply to the Supreme Court for a parentage order in respect of the child. The extent to which a co-parent who is recognised in state or territory legislation qualifies as a parent in the context of the FLA remains unclear. Section 60H of the FLA, which deals with the parentage of children born as a result of artificial conception procedures, does not provide for recognition of a biological parents same-sex partner. A co-parents recognition under the FLA would potentially turn on whether the court determines section 60H to be an exhaustive definition of who may be recognised as the parent of a child born through an artificial conception procedure. (b) Adoption Parents who opt to adopt a child are recognised as legal parents under the FLA. All states and territories provide for married and heterosexual de facto couples to jointly adopt children. In special circumstances, the opposite-sex partner of a childs biological parent may adopt his or her child. Only in three jurisdictions may a child may be adopted by the same-sex partner of their biological parent. In the remaining jurisdictions a child may only have one parent of each gender, so adoption of a child by its parents same-sex partner cancels out the pre-existing child-parent relationship (c) Parenting Orders Parental responsibility may be conferred on adults who are not otherwise parents under the FLA but who opt to apply for a parenting order in the Family Court. Section 65G of the FLA allows lesbian and gay couples to apply to the Family Court for an order by consent in favour of a non-parent to confer responsibility on a co-parent for the childs long-term or daytoday care, welfare and development. Significantly, such orders can only give a co-parent responsibility for his or her child on the basis that they are a non-parent (rather than the childs second legal parent). Unlike adoption, parenting orders only operate until the relevant child turns 18 and do not necessarily create a legal child-parent relationship which will allow a child to access a range of rights and benefits under other state, territory and federal laws. The Family Court may use its discretion to make such parenting orders as it thinks proper. However, the Court operates on the principle that ideally legal parents under the FLA should be the ones to share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children. Other adults, including co-parents, can only appeal to the Courts discretion as to what arrangements are in the childs best interests. The exercise of discretion in such circumstances is necessarily influenced by the particular decision-makers awareness of and sensitivity to the needs of children parented by same-sex couples. B. Why legal child-parent relationships matter to childrens rights State, territory and federal laws work cooperatively to protect childrens rights by imposing specific obligations on parents and, in turn, supporting parents to uphold those rights. What follows is an analysis of how the laws failure to recognise childrens relationships with their same-sex parents impacts detrimentally upon their right to birth registration, parental care and an adequate standard of living. i. The right to birth registration Every child has the right, under Article 7 of the Convention, to be registered immediately after birth through a document that details his or her age and family affiliations. In Australia, a childs biological parents are automatically recorded on the birth certificate. Yet the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child requires States to include upon registration all information on the elements of the childs identity given that the absence of such basic documentation detailing the childs family affiliations may hamper the implementation of a childs other rights. In light of this requirement, Tobin believes that it is crucial for States to record details of people who have voluntarily consented to act as the parent of a child. This ensures that a childs birth registration represents the realistic make-up of his or family and thus, his or her actual family affiliations. Parenting presumptions which recognise the biological mothers male partner as a legal parent ensure that his details are placed on the birth certificate of a child born through assisted reproduction. However, in jurisdictions other than the ACT and Western Australia, the birth certificate of children born through assisted reproduction to same-sex couples excludes the details of the childs co-parent. ii. The right to know and be cared for by ones parents Parents have the legal authority to make decisions on behalf of their children in important areas such as discipline, education and healthcare. This is essential to a childs right under Article 9 of the Convention to know and be cared for by his or her parents. Yet children of same-sex couples may have to wait for extended periods before their co-parent obtains legal decision-making authority through a parenting or adoption order. As McNair notes, this delay is particularly problematic given that prevailing societal attitudes are less likely to recognise the co-mothers or co-fathers parental status. In general, a childs right to parental care is also supported by workplace allocation of parental leave and government child-care allowances, which assist working parents to arrange care for their children. For example, state and territory jurisdictions commonly allow a male employee to take paternity leave in connection with his partners pregnancy, even if he is not the biological father of her child. However, a female employee cannot generally take maternity leave or parental leave in connection with her partners pregnancy unless a parentage presumption recognises her as the forthcoming childs legal parent. Further, where a child has two legally recognised parents and one of them dies or becomes incapacitated, children have the security of knowing that they will remain in the care their surviving parent. This is an area where securing the legal status of co-parents is particularly significant for children of lesbian and gay couples. Polikoffs research reports the experiences of children in the United States who have endured the death of their biological parent and consequently become the subject of a traumatic residency battle between their co-parent and third parties, such as family members of the deceased. In these cases, residency has frequently been awarded to third parties, resulting in the child being removed from the only family home he or she has ever known. Although there appears to have been no research on the experiences of Australian children in this context, there is certainly the potential for such battles to be reproduced in the Family Court. iii. The right to an adequate standard of living Under Article 27 of the Convention children have a right to a standard of living adequate for the childs physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. The State assists parents to secure their childrens standard of living through a range of legislative mechanisms. For example, where parents are unable to raise sufficient income to meet their childrens needs, they become eligible for income-boosting social security payments. In the same way, workers compensation provides an income safety net for the children of parents who become temporarily or permanently incapacitated. Where a parent dies, a childs guardian can access death benefits from the deceased parents superannuation fund on the childs behalf, which can be used towards preserving the childs standard of living. A child may also be entitled to payments under statutory victim or accident compensation schemes upon the death of his or her parents. Some workers and statutory compensation schemes allow the non-biological child of a co-parent to receive benefits through recognition of a loco parentis (in place of a parent) relationship. 鱨վ may also be entitled to such compensation payments if they were financially dependent on the co-parent. Commonwealth superannuation legislation provides for death benefits to be paid to the dependants of a contributor following his or her death. Whilst biological, adopted and stepchildren automatically qualify to receive death benefits with a tax concession, an unrecognised co-parents child must prove that he or she was financially dependent on the deceased to receive a similar entitlement. 鱨վ of unrecognised co-parents are also entirely excluded from the hierarchy of people who stand to inherit the estate of a co-parent who dies without leaving a valid will. These examples illustrate how the laws failure to recognise a childs co-parent can prevent that child from accessing the financial resources necessary for him or her to maintain an adequate standard of living, particularly in times of crisis. C. 鱨վs rights and family breakdown Research indicates childrens rights are placed at an increased risk when their family unit breaks down due to parental separation. The Commonwealth Government has instituted special legislative measures to protects childrens rights to maintenance and to contact with both of his or her parents upon the breakdown of a marriage. Part VIII of the FLA governs the distribution of property and the making of spousal maintenance orders following the breakdown of married relationships. As detailed below, Part VIII is extremely significant to childrens rights to care and an adequately standard of living. For example, just and equitable property settlements often secure the marital home as a home for the children, whilst maintenance payments provide income support for parents responsible for childrens day-to-day care. Since the 1980s all states and territories have enacted some form of presumptive scheme to govern property division between de facto couples and sometimes, the making of spousal maintenance orders. Yet the limited coverage and inconsistent features of these schemes mean children of de facto couples, particularly same-sex de facto partners, receive far less protection compared to children of married couples. This evidence suggests that from a childrens-rights perspective, it would be beneficial for the property and maintenance obligations of de facto couples to be governed by Part VIII of the FLA, just as parental responsibility is governed uniformly by Part VII. i. The right to maintenance The Federal Governments obligation under Article 28 of the Convention to secure financial maintenance for a child from his or her parents generally arises where parents separate or divorce. The Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (Cth) (CSAA) obliges all parents to maintain their children financially until the age of 18 by distributing to them a percentage of the parents income, determined using a fixed legislative formula. The government has declared that [e]nsuring the payment of child support is one part of a bigger picture of encouraging the continuing involvement of both parents in the upbringing of their children. However, where a childs relationship with their co-parent is unrecognised, the child or his or her guardian cannot claim financial support from the co-parent under the CSAA. Although one of the opt-in parenting arrangements for lesbian and gay couples adoption places an obligation of support on co-parents under the CSAA, parenting orders do not of themselves make a co-parent a liable parent for the purposes of child support. Although the FLA can require a step-parent to maintain their partners child in special circumstances, the term step-parent is confined to a married parents opposite-sex husband or wife. In 1996 in Australia, a parent went to court to claim child support money from her ex-partner her childrens co-parent. In that case, the co-parent was ordered to pay her ex-partner $150,000 for the benefit of the children on the basis of promissory estoppel. Here, the court held that the co-mother had a parental responsibility to provide child support on the basis of her implied promise to parent each of the children. However, as Millbank highlights, pursuing maintenance through the courts in this way is an expensive and uncertain process. As such, the CSAAs failure to recognise co-parents as liable parents generally corresponds with a denial of an enforceable right to maintenance for children of same-sex couples. ii. The right to an adequate standard of living The FLAs property distribution scheme provides for the division of property between separating married couples. Aspects of the FLA property distribution scheme are specifically oriented towards protecting a childs right to an adequate standard of living. When considering a property adjustment application, a Family Court judge is directed to consider (amongst other things) the existing and future needs of both parties, with particular reference to the financial needs of a parent who has assumed care and control of children of the marriage. Thus, the Court determines what property arrangement is just and equitable in light of the resources required by the primary caregiver to support the separating couples child or children. At the state and territory level, all jurisdictions have legislative schemes which provide for the distribution of property (excluding superannuation) upon the separation of de facto partners. All such schemes cover both heterosexual and same-sex relationships, other than in South Australia, where the government has promised to remove discrimination against lesbian and gay couples in the immediate future. State-based de facto schemes adjust the parties rights differently when there are children of the relationship. Varying the financial interests of de facto partners where children are involved reflects the profound impact of parenthood upon the economic interests of the parties, as Parkinson states: We are entitled to treat theirs as a socio-economic partnership with wealth-transferring consequences whether or not this was their intention, and whether or not they made a commitment to partnership, because parenthood has effected a change in their relationship which requires limitations to be placed upon their assertion of individualised financial autonomy. Yet the extent to which decision-makers are directed to consider the needs of children when de facto couples separate varies with jurisdiction. In three jurisdictions, de facto property division is very similar to the process set out for married couples in the FLA. There, the court is directed to consider the present and the future needs of the parties, including needs related to the provision of care for children of the relationship. Elsewhere, the court is restricted to examining the contributions made by the parties during their relationship, without reference to their future needs. Legislation in the ACT and South Australia does not specifically refer to the future needs of the parties, but the court is directed to broadly consider other relevant matters which would reasonably include the needs of any children of the relationship. From a childrens-rights perspective, it is essential that courts examine the future needs of the parties to ensure primary caregivers have access to the resources necessary to care for children on a long-term basis. iii. The right to care A party to a marriage is liable to maintain the other party financially following separation if they are unable to support themselves adequately because they have care and control of a child of the marriage. Spousal maintenance has the potential to support a childs right to care upon separation by providing the primary caregiver with additional income. Yet a de facto partner who has care and control of such children cannot access maintenance payments from their ex-partner in three states, whilst in two other jurisdictions, maintenance support is only available until the child reaches the age of 12 (or 16 if the child is physically or mentally disabled). Limiting access to maintenance in this fashion only contributes to the financial difficulties faced by primary caregivers and their children following relationship breakdown. iv. The right to contact Although one parent may perform the role of primary caregiver following separation, the FLA also protects a childs right to ongoing contact with both parents, as long as such contact is in the childs best interests. This right is upheld on the assumption that most children want and need contact with both parents, and that the wellbeing of children is advanced by their maintaining links with both parents over time. The Federal Governments proposed amendments to the FLA place a renewed emphasis on the importance of ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child. Yet upon the breakdown of a same-sex relationship, children have no right to contact with a co-parent whose parental role is not recognised in law. A co-parent has the standing to apply to the Family Court for a contact order as a person concerned with the care, welfare or development of the child. However, in the context of such applications, research indicates that the court has often noted a preference for biological parents over applicants with other relationships to the child. The FLA and the Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006 (Cth) have been carefully crafted to safeguard the importance of a childs right to contact with both parents following separation. However, the Federal Governments policy decision to exclude same-sex couples from accessing the Family Court upon relationship breakdown prevents their children benefiting from such safeguards. D. Partial recognition of family equals partial recognition of childrens rights Legal child-parent relationships secure essential rights for children regarding their day-to-day care and protection, including the right to support from the State in times of need. The laws failure to recognise childrens co-parents in the context of same-sex relationships does not prevent lesbian and gay couples sharing parental responsibility for their children. However, it does impact detrimentally on their childrens rights. When it comes to the breakdown of family units, children of de facto couples, particularly of same-sex de facto couples, receive sub-standard protection compared to children of married parents. As outlined above, whether the future needs of children are considered in the division of property between de facto parties depends in which state or territory a childs family resides. Further, a primary caregivers ability to provide for children can only be eased by maintenance support in restricted circumstances. The overall result of these inequities is a familial hierarchy, where childrens rights are differentially upheld according to the jurisdiction in which their family lives and the marital status and sexual orientation of their parents. This outcome presents a grim picture of Australias performance of its obligation under the Convention to respect and ensure the rights of each child without discrimination of any kind. In order to honour our international commitment to childrens rights, Australian lawmakers need to rethink existing approaches to the recognition of family relationships. 鱨վs rights must be at the forefront of efforts to enact presumptive legislation which secures equitable treatment for all children, regardless of whether their parents have chosen, or been able, to opt-in to the institution of marriage. 3. A childrens-rights approach to relationship recognition This part will explore how presumptive and opt-in legislation could be adapted to better protect the rights of children of lesbian and gay parents. I argue that from a childrens- rights perspective, a new federal relationships scheme is essential to obtaining consistency and equity of treatment for children across Australia. I then explore the possibility of a federal model based on Tasmanias Relationships Act 2003, Australias most recent comprehensive relationship-recognition scheme implemented at the state and territory level. A. Why a federal scheme? The inconsistent coverage of de facto relationships under state and territory schemes detailed above illustrates the need for a federal relationship regime which uniformly recognises parents and personal relationships across Australia. In the past decade, commentators including the Law Council of Australia and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission have called for a federal scheme to remedy the appalling lack of uniformity between jurisdictions. From a best-interests perspective, a case may be made for reserving federal regulation for marital families, to ensure that Commonwealth law continues to promote the hetero-nuclear family as the preferable or ideal environment for the protection of childrens interests. In contrast, a childrens-rights perspective requires lawmakers to reflect on the inequity that children of de facto couples currently face under divergent state and territory schemes. Having chosen to ratify the Convention, the Federal Government has an obligation to rectify law which erodes childrens rights. The Commonwealth could use its financial and political power to pressure the states and territories into enacting their own uniform legislation for de facto couples. However, there are many reasons why a childrens-rights approach to relationships requires a federal scheme which is controlled and administered by the Commonwealth. First, a federal scheme would be far easier to amend over time, compared with the difficulty and expense of implementing change at the state and territory level. Ongoing technological development in the area of artificial conception is only one instance where legislation governing parenting and relationships will need to be regularly updated to protect childrens rights. Another possible instance is the need for change provoked by feedback from the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, in response to Australias regular submissions on its compliance with the Convention. The likelihood of a federal de facto scheme being kept up-to-date would undoubtedly depend upon on the political priorities of the reigning government. However, a federal scheme would nonetheless provide a national focus for debate, in the shadow of Australias commitment to childrens rights, without the difficulty and expense of carrying-out negotiations between the Federal Government and state and territory legislatures. Further, a federal approach to relationships also promises to improve de facto parties access to legal protections and remedies. A de facto scheme administered by the Family Court is likely to be a far quicker and cheaper method of resolving disputes compared to existing schemes which require parties to initiate proceedings in local courts. This fact alone is likely to encourage disadvantaged parties such as primary caregivers who have left the workforce to care for children to utilise legal remedies when they cannot privately negotiate a just outcome. Specifically, increased accessibility promotes the public interest in ensuring that primary caregivers can uphold their childrens rights to an adequate standard of living following the breakdown of a relationship. B. Implementing a federal scheme Legal commentators have theorised that it may be possible for the Federal Government to enact a federal relationship-recognition scheme using a broad interpretation of the section 51(xxi) marriage power. In 2003, the Family Court recognised that the definition of marriage is not frozen in time and could potentially extend to recognition of marriage-like relationships. A federal relationships scheme could also be interpreted as giving effect to the governments international obligations under the Convention, supported by the s51(xxix) external affairs power. However, a formal referral of state legislative powers under s51(xxxvii) of the Constitution would give the Commonwealth clear constitutional authority to enact comprehensive legislation for de facto couples. Indeed, in 2002, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General agreed in principle that the states and territories would refer their powers over the financial interests of de facto couples to the Commonwealth. At present, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria have all referred power to the Commonwealth to legislate in respect of the property of de facto partners. South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia are yet to do so. C. What a federal scheme might look like lessons from Tasmania In order to illuminate what a federal scheme might look like, the discussion below examines three key elements of Tasmanias comprehensive relationship scheme outlined implemented through the Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) (hereafter, the Tasmanian Act). This Act broke new ground by combining presumptive recognition of a broad range of relationships with unique opt-in measures. It recognises a diversity of heterosexual, same-sex and caring relationships without placing them in a hierarchy. This approach challenges pre-existing notions of the ideal family by providing a multitude of options for legal recognition of different kinds of relationships. i. An equitable presumptive safety net A childrens-rights approach to relationship recognition would require a new federal scheme to establish a broad-reaching presumptive safety net. In extending part VII of the FLA to ex-nuptial children, state, territory and federal governments recognised the need for parental obligations to flow presumptively, rather than on the basis of parental choice. Opt-in mechanisms like marriage give partners the choice of undertaking additional legal obligations. In practice, a wealthier partner may well choose not to opt-in, to prevent the possibility of a less-wealthy partner such as the stay-at-home parent claiming support for themselves or their children. In contrast, presumptive law protects the rights of primary caregivers and their children by providing legal remedies to those who need them most, when they need them most regardless of whether or not a couple has opted to formalise their relationship. (a) Equity for heterosexual and same-sex couples The Tasmanian Act governs significant relationships between two adults who are not married or related by family and caring relationships between two adults who are not married or in a significant relationship, where one or both parties provide the other with domestic support and personal care. The Act provides for significant relationships to be formally registered or alternatively presumed into existence following the courts examination of a range of specific factors. Like relationship legislation in the ACT, NSW, Queensland, Western Australia, Victoria and the Northern Territory, the Tasmanian Act does not discriminate on the basis of gender and thus, applies equally to same-sex and heterosexual couples. Adopting a gender-neutral definition of de facto at the federal level would guarantee the families of same-sex couples extensive access to rights and benefits currently available to heterosexual de facto and married couples in areas like taxation, social security and federal workers compensation. It would also pave the way for the FLAs parenting presumptions regarding children born through assisted conception procedures to be extended to include the same-sex de facto partner of the birth mother. However, a gender-inclusive definition of de facto would be out-of-step with the Federal Governments current refusal to utilise a referral of state powers to enact legislation for same-sex couples. Although eager to extend part VIII of the FLA to heterosexual de facto couples, the Federal Government has declared that it regards same-sex couples as being in a different situation to heterosexual couples. The Federal Governments discriminatory stance has serious implications for the rights of children of lesbian and gay parents. But however the Federal Government may choose to define the difference in the different situation of same-sex couples, it is extremely unlikely that such a definition could reasonably be used to justify an argument that children of same-sex couples having different rights. Yet as part two illustrates, differential treatment of same-sex couples has extensive detrimental flow-on effects in terms of childrens rights. A childs right to parental care, an adequate standard of living, financial maintenance and state assistance are all diminished where lesbian and gay couples are excluded from relationship-recognition schemes. As such, any new federal scheme which extended marital privileges to opposite-sex de facto couples alone would be in clear breach of Australias obligations under Article 2 of the Convention, which requires States to recognise childrens rights irrespective of their parents gender or sexual orientation. Further, the Federal Governments position is socially divisive and risks encouraging homophobic sentiment in the Australian community. In her 2004 research, McNair recognised that there are significant influences on a childs outcomes that are external to the family and can be out of the familys immediate control. These influences include the community, culture and society in which the family exists. According to McNair, social stigmatisation -defined as a lack of social acceptance - can have extensive negative effects on children of lesbian and gay couples and can lead to various forms of discrimination, that in turn contribute to reduced social support, increased experiences of violence, marginalisation, low self-esteem, increased stress and ultimately poor mental health and wellbeing. McNairs extensive review of research concludes that, overall, children of same-sex couples are remarkably resilient to stigmatisation and do not differ from other children in their emotional, social and psychological development. Nonetheless, McNairs call for social policy and legislation to keep pace with social change resonate in Australias pluralistic society where an increasing number of lesbian and gay couples are choosing to have children. In this context, the Federal Government has a responsibility to respond to the needs of children in a diverse range of families by doing what it can to broaden social value systems and promote acceptance, rather than accommodating discriminatory public policies which are conducive to social stigmatisation. Confining a new federal de facto scheme to heterosexual couples would effectively undo the work of state and territory legislatures which, over the past decade, have almost all adjusted public policy to work towards removing social and legal discrimination against same-sex couples and their children. Such a choice would represent a step-back-in-time in Australias journey towards a family law system that does not discriminate on the basis of gender or sexual orientation. (b) Equity between de facto and married couples The Tasmanian Act virtually replicates the property division and spousal maintenance clauses in Part VIII of the FLA to place couples in significant relationships on par with married couples. This approach recognises that a childs right to parental care and the financial resources necessary for an adequate standard of living should not differ simply because the childs parents do not or cannot choose to marry. Indeed, the Commonwealth Attorney-General is already in agreement on the desirability of extending Part VIII of the FLA to heterosexual de facto couples, and has given an undertaking to do so once all States have referred their powers. (c) Contracting out of the presumptive safety net Would a federal presumptive scheme as broad as Tasmanias create unjustified intrusions in the private lives of individuals? Parkinson makes a strong case for differentiating between married and de facto couples without children when it comes to legislative property distribution mechanisms. His research highlights important differences between the intentions and experiences of de facto and married partners to support an argument that they should not always be treated alike when it comes to property division. The Tasmanian scheme does not, of course, prevent parties from making their own property arrangements upon relationship breakdown and also allows parties to contract out of the presumptive safety net through personal relationship agreements. However, the Tasmanian Act limits parties ability to cut escape-routes in the safety net when there are children involved. For example, a personal relationship agreement cannot prevent the court from making an order regarding a child of the parties. Further, a court may set aside an agreement if a change in the circumstances of the parties means that enforcing it would result in serious injustice. These limitations correspond with the FLAs limits on agreements between married couples, which prevent parents contracting away their access to relief which could be essential to providing for children of the relationship. ii. Opt-in equity for same-sex couples? Part two of the Tasmanian Act provides de facto couples with the choice of registering their relationship by lodging a formal deed with a government registrar. Tasmanias opt-in registration scheme could be effectively enacted at the federal level by allowing same-sex couples to marry, or by introducing a parallel partnership registration scheme of the kind available in other parts of the world. From a childrens-rights perspective, a federal opt-in mechanism for same-sex couples would only be desirable if it promised to provide children with additional benefits to those provided by the type of equitable presumptive safety net outlined above. Below, I explore several key reasons why giving lesbian and gay couples the opportunity to opt-in to relationship recognition is crucial to the rights of their children. Like marriage, registration under the Tasmanian scheme confers immediate rights and responsibilities upon the parties. Registration brings with it the peace of mind that either partner will be able to access legal remedies and assistance in times of crisis without having to first prove the couples relationship to a court. Although some partners may be happy to rely on the presumptive safety-net, registration allows couples who do wish to secure their rights and more importantly, their childrens rights the ability to do so. Same-sex couples with children are likely to have a particular interest in ensuring that their relationship will be recognised immediately in times of potential crisis, such as the death or incapacity of a partner or relationship breakdown, where their childrens rights are most at risk. Further, an overwhelming benefit of allowing same-sex couples to marry would be the potential to challenge social discrimination which adversely impacts the lives of children parented by lesbian and gay couples. Whilst many children of lesbian and gay parents report feeling that their family is special they are also more likely to receive negative feedback from their community regarding the sexual orientation of their parents. Homophobic comments from friends, teachers, religious leaders and political figures can not only prevent children from talking openly about their families, but can contribute to a sense of isolation and reduced self-esteem. Social prejudice also contributes to a lack of community social support for such children and their families. In a 2001 study involving children of lesbian and gay parents, a number of students commented that it would make a difference to them if there was more safety and visibility for gay men and lesbians. Yet laws like the current Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) which discriminate against same-sex couples contribute to a cultural environment which validates homophobic prejudice. Legal discrimination reinforces a social belief that it is possible to make assumptions about the parenting abilities, values and lifestyles of people based on their sexual orientation. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that same-sex couples are less varied in their values and lifestyles than the wider community. Marriage would allow same-sex couples to demonstrate that their partnerships can be just as sound, committed and enduring as the best of heterosexual unions and thus, that lesbian and gay couples have the same capacity as heterosexual couples to provide the love, care and devotion that is essential to raising healthy, happy children. In addition, Article 2 of the Convention recognises that it is in every childs best interests to be free from discrimination. Promoting marriage equity for same-sex couples has the potential to foster a social environment which is more accepting of a diverse range of families and relationships. Social discrimination, whether it be based on homophobia, racism, sexism or any other kind of prejudice creates a divisive community environment which is harmful to all children, not just those to whom discrimination is directed. Privileging relationships on the basis of the parties sexuality rather than their level of commitment to one another offers no social benefits. As former Chief Justice of the Family Court, Alastair Nicholson, has declared: One of the fundamental misconceptions which plagues me is the failure to understand that heterosexual family life in no way gains status, security or respect by the denigration or refusal to acknowledge same-sex families. The sum social good is in fact reduced because when a community refuses to recognise and protect genuine commitment made by its members, the state acts against everybodys interests. Yet the likelihood of same-sex couples being able to marry in Australia at any time in the near future is minimal, given that only recently, the Federal Government with the Oppositions full support amended the Marriage Act 1961(Cth) to exclusively define marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life. Although the Government claimed that this amendment was not homophobic, it was the first time in Australias history that a federal government has wound back the rights of lesbians and gay men. Its passing provided a prominent opportunity for religious and political spokespersons to ruthlessly denigrate lesbian and gay relationships in the name of protecting the family. This recent social phenomenon suggests that as long as marriage is reserved for heterosexual couples, social discrimination against same-sex couples and their children will remain very much alive and well. A possible alternative to allowing same-sex marriage would be to create a federal civil union or domestic partnership parallel registration scheme. When introducing a civil union bill in the New Zealand Parliament in 2004, Prime Minister Clark was at pains to point out that civil unions were not marriage by another name. Whilst the New Zealand government remains committed to marriage as a cultural and religious institution for one man and one woman, civil unions have been promoted as a straightforward method for same-sex couples to secure legal recognition of their relationships. Whether conservative legislators in Australia would oppose the introduction of a national civil union scheme with the same vigour as the prospect of same-sex marriage has not yet been tested. However, guidance may be taken from the debate over the ACT Governments recent tabling of the Civil Union Bill 2006 (ACT). When the ACT Government announced its intention to legislate for civil unions, the Commonwealth Attorney-General said that the states had the power to determine whether to allow same-sex civil unions. Yet release of the Civil Union Bill 2006 (ACT) provoked media uproar, with the Attorney-General and the Prime Minister threatening to overturn the Bill on the basis that it threatened to reduce the status of marriage. At the time of writing, the future of Civil Union Bill 2006 (ACT) remains unclear. From a different perspective, the New South Wales Gay and Lesbian Rights Group have stated that they do not support the introduction of a parallel recognition scheme such as civil unions on the basis that it would create a relationship hierarchy that permanently relegated same-sex relationships to second-class status. Overall, although marriage or a parallel registration scheme could confer equal legal benefits upon the children of same-sex couples, a parallel registration scheme is far less likely to tackle the social discrimination suffered by same-sex couples and their children. D. Summary of a new federal scheme Throughout this section I have argued that a new federal relationship scheme is essential to securing the rights of children parented by same-sex couples. Accepting a formal referral of state powers would enhance the Federal Governments capacity to ensure that Australia fulfils its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child by recognising and regulating families in a manner consistent with the rights of children. Ideally, a federal model would utilise a combination of presumptive and opt-in mechanisms to create multiple options for the recognition and protection of a diverse range of families. Chiefly, a broad presumptive safety net should invoke a non-discriminatory definition of de facto relationship, to ensure that heterosexual and same-sex relationships receive equal protection under the scheme and across all federal legislation. In addition to presumptive legislation, a commitment to the rights of children parented by same-sex couples would require the Federal Government to provide gay men and lesbians with the choice of opting-in to a relationship registration scheme. A non-discriminatory registration mechanism would, for the first time, empower lesbian and gay parents to secure their childrens rights in a straightforward manner, without having to appeal to the discretion of the courts. It appears that marriage will, for the time being, be reserved exclusively for heterosexual couples. Nonetheless, extending federal civil union or registration rights to same-sex couples would be a positive future step towards increasing the visibility of same-sex relationships and challenging societys historically narrow focus on the hetero-nuclear unit as the ideal family formation. 4. Final Conclusion Upon completion of the Federal Governments most recent report to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in September 2005, the Attorney General re-affirmed the Governments agenda to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations human rights treaty body system. However, critiquing state, territory and federal relationship legislation in a childrens-rights framework exposes the disadvantage suffered by children whose families do not fit the traditional mould of the hetero-nuclear unit. In response, I argue that the law should be changed to extend the rights-related benefits currently enjoyed by children of married heterosexual couples to children of de facto heterosexual and same-sex couples. I acknowledge that this goal will by no means revolutionise the way Australian legislatures approach the care of children. Yet in the short term, legislative reforms of the kind outlined in part three are relatively straight-forward and promise to secure important rights for children by formalising the responsibilities and obligations of co-parents. A childrens rights agenda demands that equitable parenting, property division and maintenance laws flow presumptively to all married and de facto couples. Realistically, all relationships run the risk of breakdown and it is essential that parents cannot opt-out of obligations to support their children. Gay and Lesbian parents continue to fight for the opportunity to protect their childrens rights using existing avenues of recognition and progress in state and territory legislatures continues despite the Federal Governments discriminatory agenda. A growing body of research indicates that it is the quality of a childs parenting, rather than the identity of the parents which is central to a childs well-being. In this context, legal recognition of childrens relationships with their same-sex parents, along with acknowledgment of the relationships between gay and lesbian couples, promises to contribute to securing State protection and support for a wider range of families. This outcome would be a desirable step towards a social environment where all children enjoy their rights free from prejudice and discrimination, just as the Convention intends. ( Heidi Yates BA/LLB (Hons) (ANU).  Victorian Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, Enough is enough: A report on discrimination and abuse experienced by lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender people in Victoria (2000): < HYPERLINK "http://nla.gov.au/nla.arc-46167" http://nla.gov.au/nla.arc-46167 > (24 April 2006); Lesbians on the Loose readership survey, Lesbians on the Loose (Sydney) Vol 11, no. 4, 2000 at 9; J Millbank for the NSW Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, Meet the Parents: A Review of the Research on Lesbian and Gay Families (2002).  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends (2003) at 16-18.  The Hon Philip Ruddock, MP (Attorney-General), Press Release: Bill Marks Cultural Shift in Family Breakdown (8 December 2005).  Ibid.  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990 (hereafter UNCROC).  P Parkinson & J Behrens, Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, 2004) at 793. M Otlowski & B M Tsamenyi, An Australian Family Law Perspective on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1992) 16.  For an insight into where and how the best-interests principle arises in each of these countries, see P Alston (ed), The Best-interests of the Child: Reconciling Culture and Human Rights (1994) and C Smart & S Sevenhuijsen (eds), Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (1989).  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 64B(2), 65E.  M Fineman, Child Advocacy and the Transformation of Custody Decision Making in the USA in Smart & Sevenhuijsen (eds), Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (1989) at 27, 31.  H Reece, The paramountcy principle: Consensus or Construct? (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems, 267 at 267.  Id at 273.  J Elster, Solomonic Judgements (1989) at 134.  Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 106 ALR 385 at 421 (Justice Brennan).  Fineman, above n 10 at 36.  Reece, above n 11 at 290-299. Ibid; Also see the North American case of Bottoms v. Bottoms 444 S.E.2d (Va. App. 1994) 276 at 279-80 although note that this Circuit Court decision in favour of the maternal grandmother was overturned by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1995 . R Robson Our 鱨վ: Kids of Queer Parents and Kids who are Queer: Looking at Sexual Minority Rights from a Different Perspective (2001) 64 Albany Law Review 915 at 917; S B Boyd, What is a Normal Family? (1992) 55 Modern Law Review at 269.  S Hannaford, Libs to vote against gay adoption, The Canberra Times (18 Nov 2003) at 5; S Hannaford, Same-sex adoption debate makes tough questions unavoidable, TCT (22 Nov 2003) at 5; Catherine Naylor, ACT same-sex couples can now adopt, TCT (11 Feb 2004) at 2; M Marino, PM may overturn Gay Law, The Age (9 Mar 2004) at 1.  P Ettelbrick, Who is a parent?: The need to develop a lesbian conscious family law (1993) Spring New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 513 at 546. Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Forward in Deirdre Fottrell (ed), Revisiting 鱨վs Rights: 10 years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000).  M Freeman, Taking 鱨վs Rights More Seriously in P Alston, S Parker & J Seymour (eds), 鱨վ, Rights, and the Law (1992) 52 at 54; J Eekelaar The importance of thinking that children have rights in P Alston, S Parker & J Seymour (eds), 鱨վ, Rights, and the Law (1992) 221 at 225-228. Eekelaar, above n 21 at 224 -226. Id at 227. Id at 221, 228. Id at 226. Ibid.  J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1973) at 11.  M Freeman, The Rights and the Wrongs of 鱨վ (1983) at 4.  In her 2004 survey of Australian and International research on children of lesbian and gay parents, McNair observes that there is a noticeable gap in research when it come to the perspectives and experiences of children or adults who are growing up, or have grown up, with gay or lesbian parents: R McNair for the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Outcomes for 鱨վ Born of A.R.T. in a Diverse Range of Families (2004) at 54.  S Toope, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Implications for Canada in M Freeman (ed), 鱨վs Rights: A Comparative Perspective (1996) 33 at 35.  UNCROC preamble.  M Freeman, The Future of 鱨վs Rights (2000) 14 鱨վ & Society 277 at 277.  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties: As of 19 April 2006: < HYPERLINK "http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf" http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf> (24 April 2006).  See Articles 43 and 44 of UNCROC which establish and describe the Committee.  UNCROC arts 7, 9, 27.  See the Hon Philip Ruddock, MP (Attorney General), Press Release: Government defends Marriage (27 May 2004); the Catholic Churchs submissions in McBain v Victoria [2000] FCA 1009; statements by Jim Wallace, Executive Director of the Australia Christian Lobby in M Boogs Hundreds protest against same-sex adoption law The Canberra Times (22 Nov 2003) at 3.  J Tobin for the Victorian Law Reform Commission, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Rights and Best Interests of 鱨վ Conceived Through Assisted Reproduction (2004) at 7-11.  Id at 8.  UNCROC art 2(2); Tobin, above n 37 at 4.  Ibid.  UNCROC, art 12.  Tobin, above n 37 at 16.  S Parker, The Best Interests of the Child Principles and Problems (1994) 8 International Journal of Law and the Family 26 at 39-40. Otlowski & Tsamenyi, above n 7 at 16.  For example, Article 18 of the UNCROC requires States to assist parents in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities in order to guarantee and promote the rights set down in the Convention.  Eekelaar, above n 21 at 227.  Research indicates that separation of a childs parents places childrens rights, in particular their right to an adequate standard of living, at an increased risk. See R Weston Income Circumstances of Parents and 鱨վ: A Longitudinal View in Funder, Harrison & Weston (eds), Settling Down (1993) at 139; P Amato & A Booth, A Generation at Risk (1997).  M Zingo & K Early, Nameless Persons: Legal Discrimination Against Non-Marital 鱨վ in the United States (1994) at 16.  In 2001, 31 per cent of children were born outside marriage. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Births (2002) cat no 3301.0, 11.  Chapter VII of the FLA was originally enacted through the Commonwealth Governments s 51(xxi) and s 51(xxii) constitutional powers under the Australian Constitution to make laws with respect to marriage, divorce and matrimonial causes.  The practical impact of Western Australias refusal to refer its powers is minimised as the terms of the Family Court Act 1975 (WA) regarding ex-nuptial children are almost identical to the provisions in the FLA: Parkinson & Behrens, above n 6 at 203-4,817.  Otlowski & Tsamenyi, above n 7 at 29.  S Parker Child Support in Australia; 鱨վs Rights or Public Interests? (1991) 5 International Journal of Law and the Family 24 at 26.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 61C(1), 61B.  Parkinson & Behrens, above n 6 at 817.  Id at 818.  Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 7; Status of 鱨վ Act 1974 (Vic) ss 10E, 10F; Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10c; Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 11; Status of 鱨վ Act 1996 (NSW) s 14; Status of 鱨վ Act 1974 (Tas) s 10C; Status of 鱨վ Act 1978 (Qld) ss 15, 16, 17. No specific reproductive technology legislation exists in the Northern Territory.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H(1), (4); Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 6A(1); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10d; Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 11(4); Status of 鱨վ Act 1996 (NSW) s 14; Status of 鱨վ Act 1974 (VIC) s 10C; Status of 鱨վ Act 1974 (Tas) s 10C; Status of 鱨վ Act 1978 (Qld) s 15, 16, 17.  Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 6A(1); Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 11.  Parentage Act 2004 s 11 (4).  J Seymour and S Magri for the Victorian Law Reform Commission, A.R.T., Surrogacy and Legal Parentage: A Comparative Legislative Review (2004) at 48 - 49.  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24, 25, 26.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60D(1).  Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) s 28(5), 30; Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s11(5); Adoption Act 1988 (SA) s 12(3)(a); Adoption of 鱨վ Act 1994 (WA) s 67(1); Adoption of 鱨վ Act 1964 (Qld) s 12(3); Adoption Act 1993 (ACT) s 18(3); Adoption Act 1988 (Tas) s 20(A). The Adoption of 鱨վ Act 1994 (NT) only allows for adoption by a (heterosexual) spouse who is legally married to a childs parent.  Adoption Act 1988 (Tas) s20(2A); Adoption of 鱨վ Act 1994 (WA) s 67(1); Adoption Act 1993 (ACT) s 18(3). At the time of writing, the NSW Department of Community Services is undertaking an investigation into the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) including review of the eligibility criteria for selecting and assessing adoptive parents, see NSW Department of Community Services, Review of the Adoption Act 2000: Issues Paper (April 2006) available at  HYPERLINK "http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/documents/adoption_act_review.pdf" http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/documents/adoption_act_review.pdf (24 April 2006).  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65G.  Ibid. J Millbank for the NSW Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, And thenthe brides changed nappies (2003) at 12.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65C.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65B(2)(c).  Millbank, above n 68 at 24.  Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations for Honduras, CRC/C/15Add24 para 12 in Tobin above n 37 at 29.  Although where the child has been conceived through assisted reproduction using donor sperm, the donors name is not automatically recorded on the birth certificate. Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 7; Status of 鱨վ Act 1974 (Vic) s 10F(1); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10c; Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 11 Status of 鱨վ Act 1996 (NSW) s 14; Status of 鱨վ Act 1978 (Qld) s 15, 16, 17.  Committee on the Rights of the Child, above n 72.  Tobin, above n 37 at 31. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 61B.  UNCROC, art 9; Millbank, above n 68 at 9.  As outlined above, adoption orders may only be made in favour of co-parents in the ACT, Tasmania and Western Australian. For relevant legislative sections, see footnote 65, above.  McNair, above n 29 at 16. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW): Discussion Paper No 44 (Sydney: NSW Law Reform Commission, 2002) at para 3.48; Centrelink Family Assistance Office Guide to Payments (2004) at 10.  N Polikoff This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 鱨վ in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families (1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 459 at 527-543.  Ibid.  UNCROC art 27.  Centrelink Factsheet Parenting Payment Rates (2004). For example, Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW); Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (WA);Workers Compensation Act 1953 (Vic).  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 62.  Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW);Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA); Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic); Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld); Victims of Crime Act 1994 (WA); Victims of Crime Compensation Act 1994 (Tas); Victims of Crime Act 1994 (ACT).  For detailed information regarding which state and territory legislation allows non-biological children of a deceased or injured parent to recover compensation or support payments see J Millbank If Australia Opened its Eyes to Lesbian and Gay Families, What Would it See? (1998) 12 Australian Journal of Family Law 99 at 112-133.  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 80 at para 3.78.  For example: Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 61B; Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) Part 3A. Weston above n 47; Amato & Booth, above n 47.  UNCROC arts 9, 27; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60B(2); Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (Cth).  See In Marriage of Pastrikos [1980] FLC 90-897; In Marriage of Pierce [1999] FLC 92-844.  Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 4(1), (2). See S Parker, above n 53, for a critique of the extent to which Australias Federal Child Support scheme upholds childrens rights.  The Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support, In the Best Interests of 鱨վ Reforming the Child Support Scheme (Canberra: AGPS, 2005) at 2.  Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 5, 29.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60D, 66D, 66M.  W v G (1996) 20 FAM LR 49.  J Millbank An Implied Promise to Parent: Lesbian Families, litigations and W v G (1996) 10 Australian Journal of Family Law 112.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Part VIII.  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79(4)(c), 75(2)(c).  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79(2). Note that since December 2002, the Commonwealth Superannuation Splitting regime has allowed separating married couples to divide their superannuation interests in the same way as their other assets. The scheme recognises the increasing importance of superannuation as form of wealth, particularly for individuals nearing retirement age. See Part VIIIB of the Family Law Act 1975; Family Law Legislation Amendment (Superannuation) Act 2001 (Cth).  Property Law Act 1974 (Qld); Relationships Act 2003 (Tas); Family Court Act 1997 (WA); Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic); Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW); De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA);De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT).  The Attorney-General introduced the Statutes Amendment (Relationships) Bill 2004 (SA) to update South Australian law to ensure same-sex and opposite-sex couples are treated equally. The States lower house did not complete debate on the Bill in the last sitting week in 2005 but the Government has committed to re-introducing the Bill in the immediate future: N Champion, (President, Australian Labor Party SA Branch) Letter to Lets Get Equal Campaign and Members of the Gay and Lesbian Community:  HYPERLINK "http://www.letsgetequal.org.au/alpletter.pdf" http://www.letsgetequal.org.au/alpletter.pdf (20 April 2006); South Australian Attorney Generals Office, Removing Legal Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples: Discussion Paper (Adelaide:2003) at 1; M Loader, A Recipe for Recognition of Same Sex Relationships (2004) 20 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 116, footnote 1.  Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW) s 17; Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) s 12; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 287; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 281; De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA) s 9(2).  P Parkinson, Quantifying The Homemaker Contribution In Family Property Law (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 1 at 14.  Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss 291, 292, 297-309; Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) ss 40, 47; Family Court Act 1997 (WA) s 205ZG.  Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW) s 20; De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) s 18; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 285.  Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) s 15(1)(e); De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA) s 11(1)(d).  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 72.  Family Law Council Spousal Maintenance: Discussion paper (Canberra: AGPS, 1989) at para 6.3.  Spousal maintenance is not available to de facto partners in South Australia, Queensland and Victoria. Limited spousal maintenance is available under the following legislation: Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW) s 27; Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) s 19. UNCROC art 9; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60B(2)(b); B and B [1997] FLC 92-775.  K Funder We hold these truths: a national perspective on parental responsibility, paper presented at the 5th Australian Family Research Conference, Brisbane, November 1996: < HYPERLINK "http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/afrcpapers/funder.html" http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/afrcpapers/funder.html> (24 April 2006). See also Family Law Council Patterns of Parenting after Separation Report: A Report to the Minister for Justice and Consumer Affairs (Canberra: AGPS, 1992) at 1.  This is one of the new objects which will be inserted into Part VII of the FLA, see Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006 (Cth), s 60B(1)(a).  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65C. See Millbank above n 88 at 125. See In the Marriage of Drew (1993) 16 Fam LR 536 and Hodak and Hodak v Newman (1993) 17 Fam LR 1.  UNCROC art 2.  Family Law Section of the Law Council of Australia A Proposal of Model De Facto Relationships Legislation (1998) 12(3) Australian Family Lawyer 6 at 6.  Ibid; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Report of Inquiry into a Complaint of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation: HRC Report No. 6 (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1998) at 7; Lets Get Equal Campaign Positions Statement (2001): < HYPERLINK "http://www.letsgetequal.org.au" www.letsgetequal.org.au> (10 Oct 2004); M Loader, above n 105 at 121.  Article 4 of the UNCROC requires States to take legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the Convention.  The Hon. John Hatzistergos (Minister for Justice), New South Wales, Legislative Council NSW Legislative Council Hansard, 15 October 2003 at 3843. Ibid; Dr Peter Toyne (Justice and Attorney-General), Northern Territory, Legislative Assembly, Daily Report, 15 October 2003; John Hargreaves (MLA for Bridabella), Australian Capital Territory, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates: Hansard, 8 May 2002.  As mentioned in part two, empirical research shows that mothers and their dependent children generally experience a drop in living standards following the breakdown of a marriage or de facto relationship. See Parkinson & Behrens, above n 6 at 473-487.  The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Kevin and Jennifer [2003] FamCA 94.  A recent example of the referral of State powers to enable the Commonwealth to enact uniform national legislation is the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): R Tomasic, S Bottomley & R McQueen, Corporations Law in Australia, (2nd ed, 2002) Chapter 3. Daryl Williams, Attorney General for Australia 1996 2003, Press Release: Commonwealth Wins De Facto Property Powers (8 November 2002). The ACT and the Northern Territory do not need to engage in a formal reference of power as the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to legislate for the territories under section 122 of the Australian Constitution. However, the Northern Territorys De Facto Relationships (Northern Territory Request) Act 2003 requests that any Commonwealth legislation regarding de facto relationship apply equally to same-sex and heterosexual couples.  The Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 (NSW); The Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 (QLD); Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2004 (Vic). Each of these Acts refers power in relation to certain financial matters arising out of the breakdown of de facto relationships. In this context, financial matters means any or all of the following matters: the maintenance of de facto partners, the distribution of the property of de facto partners and the distribution of any other financial resources of de facto partners including prospective superannuation entitlements or other valuable benefits of or relating to de facto partners. Each of the Acts provides for two references dealing separately with the law in relation to heterosexual couples and same sex couples.  M Loader, above n 105 at 20.  J Millbank, De Facto Relationships Amendment Bill 1998 (NSW)(1999) 8 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 1 at 19.  Millbank & Sant, A Bride in Her Every-Day Clothes: Same Sex Relationship Recognition in NSW (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 181 at 184.  Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) ss 74, 5, 6, 74. Unfortunately, this paper does not allow me to pursue further discussion of caring relationships. However, I note that providing for recognition of relationships based on domestic care and support, rather than a sexual relations, is extremely significant in terms of challenging notions of the ideal family by providing a multitude of options for legal recognition of different kinds of relationships.  Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) s 4(3). For example, section 4(2) of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) confines the definition of marriage-like relationships to heterosexual relationships. For further examples of discrimination against same-sex couples in Commonwealth legislation, see: New South Wales Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, Fact Sheet:Federal Discrimination (2004): (24 April 2006).  The current discriminatory provisions are contained in Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s60H.  Ian Munro Gay couples left out of court shift, The Age (8 March 2002) at 3.  UNCROC art 2.  McNair, above n 29 at 21.  Id at 21, 22.  Id at 6, 8.  Id at 24, 67.  But for the ability to deal with superannuation interests, which is only available in the Family Court.  Daryl Williams, above n 128.  Parkinson, above n 107.  Ibid.  Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) Part 6. Ibid at s 63.  See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 90F.  A similar registration scheme was tabled in the South Australian Parliament in May 2005 through the Relationships Bill 2005 (SA) and recommended by the Equal Opportunity Commission of Victoria in their publication Same Sex Relationships and the Law (1998) at 51.  Registered partnership schemes operate in countries including the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, Iceland, Finland, Greenland and Hawaii. For further details, see: < HYPERLINK "http://www.ilga.org" www.ilga.org> (24 April 2006).  Establishing the fact of a relationship can be a long and arduous process, requiring a party to turn over a wealth of personal and private information to the courts. Relevant evidence may include cards and letters detailing the emotional relationship between the parties, witness statements from family and friends regarding the public nature of the relationship and bank records which prove the financial interdependence of the parties. For an example of the complexity of this process, see the case of W v G (1996) 20 FAM LR 49.  J Millbank, Legal recognition of gay and lesbian families (2000) 55 Family Matters: Australian Institute of Family Studies Magazine 61 at 61.  Ibid.  Ibid.  G Mason, Violence against Lesbians and Gay Men (1993) No 2. Violence Prevention Today Australian Institute of Criminology (Canberra) at 1.  Lindy Edwards, spokesperson for ACT Lobby Group Good Process in D Landon, Gay adoption ACT to decide, The Canberra Times (17 November 2003) at 12.  Brian Greig, Senator in the Western Australian Legislative Assembly (2004) Democrat Party of Western Australia: < HYPERLINK "http://www.wa.democrats.org.au/people/greig/gayMarriageSpeech.html" http://www.wa.democrats.org.au/people/greig/gayMarriageSpeech.html> (24 April 2006).  McNair, above n 29 at 55-66; Millbank above n 1 at 37-60.  Robson above n 17 at 946.  Alastair Nicholson, The Changing Concept of Family: The Significance of Recognition and Protection (1996) 3 (6) E Law Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law [55]: < HYPERLINK "http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3n3/nicholso.html" http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3n3/nicholso.html> (26 April 2006).  Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5(1), s 88EA also specifies that certain unions are not marriages: A union solemnised in a foreign country between (a) a man and a man, or (b) a woman and another woman, must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia.  NSW Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby Press Release: Friday the 13th: Dark Day for Equality (13 August 2004).  For example, see Bishop George Pell The Case Against Gay Marriage The Australian (4 May 2004) at All-round Country p13; Bill Muehlenberg, National Vice-President of the Australian Family Association < HYPERLINK "http://www.endeavourforum.org.au/oct04-04.htm" http://www.endeavourforum.org.au/oct04-04.htm> (29 April 2006).  NZ Mulls Gay Marriage Bill, Sydney Morning Herald (22 June 2004) at 12.  The publics possible response to the notion of recognising same-sex relationships through a parallel scheme is particularly unclear given that the amendments to the Marriage Act outlined above were introduced without any community consultation or discussion: Good Process Lobby Group Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (2004, unpublished). Although the Federal Labor Party initially requested a Senate inquiry into the Bill, the Australian Labor Party decided to support the Bill only days after the closing date for submissions, which resulted in a suspension of the inquiry.  Markus Mannheim & Emma Tinkler Federal threat to veto gay Bill Canberra Times (30 March 2006) at 1. See also Markus Mannheim & Emma Tinkler Bitter stand-off over same-sex civil unions (31 March 2006) at 1.  J Millbank, De Facto Relationships Amendment Bill 1998 (NSW),(1999) 8 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 1 at 15.  M Loader, above n 105 at 123.  The Hon Philip Ruddock, MP (Attorney-General), Press Release: Australia appears before the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (14 September 2005).     PAGE  PAGE 2 s~ zADEP_<P=>Kb˹˵çٵٵْٟٛٗٗىhsI!5;CJh;5;CJ hsI!6hghK|hu*h:^jhL0JUhJ[h@jhU_0JUhFZVhFhU_jhsI!0JUhsI!hw+ j*hsI!0J5 hsI!5 hsI!5CJhsI!5:CJ$/Usz!!!.%(),-3466dxx]^ dxx^dxxxx !υ 67HK !!!x"y"z"""##4$5$+%,%%%&&4'5'())),---//0/00+2022246666666R8S8M9k9l9::::M;N;!<꽷귽귽귽ꮧ hsI!5CJhsI!56CJ hsI!CJjhsI!0JCJU hsI!5CJ h5CJ hsI!6jhsI!0JUhC hsI!hsI!5;CJhT5;CJB666L9M9l9 ?ACE]EHrK/O0O[OVPQb> ? ?@@ACCCEEE]EeFfF9G:GGGGGHHoKpK_L`LfMgM[N\NNN,O-O/O0OZO[OOOVP~QQQ6R7R9S:SUUTWUWWWWWW0Y4YqYrYYYYYYYs[h( hsI!;CJh hsI!5CJ hsI!5hsI!56CJjhsI!0JCJU hsI!CJ hsI!6hsI!jhsI!0JUHs[t[w[x[[!\\\4^8^^__3a4apaaaa\b]b c c d d d e effff*g=gggZh[hjjjkkk%l&lllmmnnnnnnnooooEpFprrrrsǾֵ֮h0~s h0~shsI! hrAa6h!]h w56CJhsI!56CJ hsI!0J hsI!6 hsI!5CJ hsI!5CJ h(h_whsI!jhsI!0JUC5^^ efffjjkGprrrttuzz#{|||@dxxdxxssssssss:t;tvvvvvwwwwwwwwxxxxx_x`xdxkxxxyyyyzzzz#{||}}}}45@ςЂIhrAa56CJjhkJ0JUhsI!56CJ hsI!6CJ hx]+hih'NhHYhr~ hsI!6hQJhF2hdPhsI!jhsI!0JUBIJdn (S$~ !ٌڌrs@AȎɎʎ<=569`񲫤h0 hsI!5CJ hsI!5CJ hi)5CJ hsI!56CJh6hBl\hPjhsI!0JB*Uphh6B*phhsI!B*phhS`hsI!jhsI!0JU=45`=>ZM+,\A x # dxx^  d7$8$H$gd!a d7$8$H$gdgdxxC+59<>Z^_fg:>? +.9:ћқӛԛJKƞǞ rsƠ',\ء\]·h!ah?NghxhJ2hKlhFQjh N0JUmH sH h NmH sH hJdh NmH sH hh N hhsI! hsI!6h?frhsI!56CJ hzmhsI!hFjhsI!0JUhsI!h*xE6]?@AפqڥۥLM uvxϨ./ɪʪʫ˫GHLQ #$WXǯȯ̯ү #ɱh)h}+hD(hhhsI!56CJh6256CJh4P hnhqjhsI!0JCJU hsI!CJ h<hsI!hUshhRLjhsI!0JUhsI!:ɱʱ̱б.12&شٴڴ%ENǵ/7̺xph`php`hXhJmH sH h[mH sH h>khmH sH h~mH sH hmH sH hPvmH sH h.dmH sH h mH sH hjhPvmH sH hPvB*phjhsI!0JB*UphhsI!B*phjhsI!0JUhsI!jh&I0JUh&Ih7shuEhq h&IhsI!h)jh)0JU"7=>FGVfilnopqruĶ^c 1ýĽ7oȽzvrmfb^hRh>m( hxKhsI! hsI!6hJJh~n hsI!;CJ hNg;CJjhsI!0JUh8EhsI! hsI!5CJ hsI!5CJ hsI!5hsI!B*phhsI!B*phh-h^ B*phhPvmH sH hQYmH sH hmH sH h ImH sH h~mH sH h[mH sH h~cmH sH #qrĶzýĽ7hi23e<+dxx dxx]dxxosQR`{FG-9PT=>MNO^lFQrηhXhh2m@h?`hdh1[hsI!B*ph hCh7dh7dhW hsI!5CJ hsI!6hh'hj%jhsI!0JUhsI!h9Brsefi+,23eiv'5>FGhi56TU\]SXcdklhh|hMhnGhhh/{hbFhV hsI!:>*hsI!56CJjhsI!0JUh3 hX=hsI! hsI!6hsI!hhXhX=A!"3rvwx17-/'(YZ&($%26Ta6hvljht0JU hsI!6h-hhK=h^{hJyhMhNh2"h{jhsI!0JUhh5|OhV2h-hsI!hh2A+6pq f g FGj>Sd  d7$8$H$gd`b dxx^dxx !mnq;<-. !! FGKpij +./:񯣯jhsI!0JCJU hsI!CJha_1hQh_Zo hlMhsI!h\ hdhsI!56CJjh,h0JUhQjhsI!0JUhsI! hsI!6 hsI!5?:;BC+,f g ~  4 5          b y z { |            G I m ˫}hLNhThQ["hh$ hh&T4h$B*phh? h1Gh&T4jhchsI!0JUh)Ch) hchchX hchsI!hsI!mH sH h%fhigjhsI!0JU hhsI! hsI!6hsI!h=1m         +:D\678BKRuvƾ|xxhnpht{h yhZ6hZhRChTW+hc.jhsI!0JUhh4h!hYUhn=hsI!hz3fhaUhCKIhLNjh1Gh&T40JUh- h1GhTh1Gh&T46 hh&T4h&T4hQ[" h1Gh&T4/$CFGJVijzCDKL]^ef29U>?BSenoq{FLﲦ|h#=^hjhgAhN@jh'0JUhXahxhJmQhFZVhXhsI!5;CJhXhsI!5;hn:h-%kh0vjhsI!0JUh&h \y h5CJ hW5CJ hsI!5CJ hsI!5hsI!ht{hT/S! !C!J##$ $$)%%&&'((K((((*3,,-.dxxdgd#=^d& !! !!!"!C!D!E!m!!!!*"+"J"K"]"_"""""A#H#J#K#L#m######$$$$$$ҼҴڴڢҙڔҙҙ҉hU_hNgmH sH  hNg6hNg6mH sH hNgB*mH phsH  hNg0JjhNgUh2|hNg6mH sH jhNg0JUhNgmH sH hNg j*hNg0JhWch 8 hsI!6hohsI!hp3$ $!$"$\$$$$$$$$%%%)%*%E%%%%%%&^&&&&&&&&&&&&d''''''''((((((('(<(K(L(M((((((ѽڱhNgCJmH sH  hNg6CJ hNgCJjhNg0JCJUhuhNgmH sH hNgH*mH sH hNg6mH sH hNgmH sH  hNg6hNgjhNg0JUhLhNgmH sH <(((((()1)z*******+++++++,,2,3,4,,,,,,9--------............//////////%/9/G/H/I/T/z/////00*18191:1;11111hNg6mH sH hNgB*mH phsH  hNg6hNgjhNg0JUhNgmH sH R...///G//9111F2Y333/555'616D6`66778k99h:W;1111111'292F2G222223 3!3D3E3X3Y3Z3u3|33333333333#4X4j455/50535b555555556 6'6(60616263696B6D6E6F6`6a6666667747hNgmH sH  hNg0J>*jhNgUjhNgUhNg6mH sH jhNg0JUhNgmH sH  hNg6hNgI47:77778889,9N9c9k9l99999:G:M:h:i::;W;X;;;]<^<<<<< =====&=*=+=@=A=i=j=k=v=w=x=============> > >>0>4>5>A>X>\>]>j>>>>>>>>>hNgB*mH phsH hNg6mH sH jhNg0JUhNgmH sH hNg hNg6RW;]<<=@=i=v=>=@@@GAqAA&CEEE"FEFnFF GHHHIPIJ 7$8$H$gdkJ>???3?7?8?F?_?c?d?p?~??????????????? @#@'@(@=@>@?@Y@]@^@m@{@@@@@@@@@@@@@4AGAHAIAWA[A\AqArAsAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBB-BFBJBKBZBgBkBlBjhNg0JUhNgmH sH hNg6mH sH  hNg6hNgWlB{BBBBBB&C'C(C5CICbCfCgCuCCCCD DwDDDDDDD3E5E6E7ExEyEEEEEEEEEEEEEEF"F#F$F3F7F8FEFFFGFVFZF[FnFoFpFʫhzC[hNg6mH sH hYhNg0JmH sH #jhYhNgUmH sH jhNgUmH sH haLhNgmH sH hNgjhNg0JUhNg6mH sH hNgmH sH >pFFFF GGGGGGGGGG H"H&H'H3HAHEHFHQHhHlHmHyHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH IIII I!I)I/IPIQIRIJJ!J"J#JĻhNg6mH sH jh/VhNg0JUh/VhNgCJmH sH h/VhNgCJjh/VhNg0JCJUh/VhNgmH sH  h/VhNg hNg6hNgjhNg0JUhNgmH sH 8J"JKKKK2LLMHNOOPPPQzQ7RRR,SISSS)T VWZgd  7$8$H$gd#JJJJJJJJKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKL)L1L2L3L@LZL^LeLfLLLLLLLLLLLLLLMMMM+M6MYM]M^MdMyMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMNN N'NQQQgQzQ{Q|QQQQ7R8ReRRRRRRRRRRSSSSS,S-S.S4SHSISJSSh NhNgmH sH  hNg6hNgB*mH phsH hNg6mH sH hNgmH sH hNgjhNg0JUMSSSSSSSSSSSSSST T T)T*T+T:T>T?TYTUUUV V V V VVV#V$V+V=VIVZVeVVV祜wwmhNgCJmH sH hhNg6CJmH sH hhNgCJmH sH hhNg6CJhhNgCJjhhNg0JCJUhhNg6mH sH hhNgmH sH jhhNg0JUhhNgB*mH phsH  hhNghhNg6hNg hNg6*VVVVVVVWWWWWWWDWkWuWvWXYYYYKYMYNYOY{Y|YYZZZcZZZZZZZZZ[ [ [[)[;[V[k[l[m[[[[[[[\'\=\ڿڴƫΣښڣښhNg6mH sH hNgmH sH hYhNg0JjhNgU h hNgjhNgU hNg6 h-hNghNgjhNg0JUhhNgmH sH hhNg6mH sH eUeke祰甊h1hNgCJh1hNgCJ\h_hNgCJ\ hNg0J>*jhNgUjhNgU hN5/hNg hNg6hNg6B*phhNgB*phhNgmH sH hNg6mH sH hNgjhNg0JUh&IhNgmH sH 2keeeeeeeeee,f8f9f:fffffgggh&h'hhhhiii i!i]iimjjjjdkekfkgk|kkkkkkkl&l'lXl˷˥꥜ꜥhNgCJmH sH hyhNgCJmH sH hv8hNgCJhv8hNg6CJhNgB*phhNg6B*ph hNgH* hNg6hNg h;]hNgjhNg0JUh1hNg6CJ hNg6CJh1hNgCJ hNgCJ4Xlllllln1nnnnnnnno+o3o4o5oooooootqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq7rDrrrr^s_s`sassĴĴh/V;hNg6 h/V;hNg hke(hNghNgmH sH  hNg6jhNg0JUhNghNgCJOJQJ^JmH sH $hhNgCJOJQJ^JmH sH hNgCJmH sH hyhNgCJmH sH "hNgCJOJQJ^JaJmH sH 2oqq_ss tt5tEtStdttt uu;uKuru~vwy8z@zHzzr{|| $^`a$ssssssss t t ttttt5t6tEtFtGtStTtdtetttttt u uuuu(u,u-u;u*jhNgUhNg6CJOJQJmH sH hNgCJOJQJmH sH 'jhNg0JCJOJQJUmH sH hNg6hNgmH sH hNg6mH sH hrhNg0JjhNgUjhNgUhNgjhNg0JUhNgCJmH sH -||||]}}}}}}}~~.~/~0~=~A~B~'()Kgiab̀̀߀·sjhNg0J>*CJ"jx hNgB*CJUphhNgB*CJphjhNgB*CJUph hNg6CJ hNgCJjhNg0JCJUhNg6H*mH sH hNg6mH sH  hNg0J>*jhNgUjhNgU hNg6jhNg0JUhNgmH sH hNg)||.~'/q˅̅ͅh]h&`#$gd&T4./01ׁpqr?DžȅɅʅ˅΅υЅºººº°…hsI!hT^W0JCJmHnHuhNg0JCJjhNg0JCJU hNg0JjhNg0JUjh)oUh)oh'hNgmH sH  hNg6h1GhNgmH sH hNg6mH sH jhNg0JUhNgmH sH hNg1ͅ΅υЅdxx/ 01h/ =!"#$%77 DyK $http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdfyK Hhttp://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf}DyK Bhttp://www.community.nsw.gov.au/documents/adoption_act_review.pdfyK http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/documents/adoption_act_review.pdf)DyK -http://www.letsgetequal.org.au/alpletter.pdfyK Zhttp://www.letsgetequal.org.au/alpletter.pdfUDyK 8http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/afrcpapers/funder.htmlyK phttp://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/afrcpapers/funder.htmlDyK www.letsgetequal.org.auyK @http://www.letsgetequal.org.au/DyK  www.ilga.orgyK *http://www.ilga.org/DyK Chttp://www.wa.democrats.org.au/people/greig/gayMarriageSpeech.htmlyK http://www.wa.democrats.org.au/people/greig/gayMarriageSpeech.htmlYDyK 9http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3n3/nicholso.htmlyK rhttp://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3n3/nicholso.html-DyK .http://www.endeavourforum.org.au/oct04-04.htmyK \http://www.endeavourforum.org.au/oct04-04.htm<@< NormalCJ_HmH sH tH R@R  Heading 1$<@&5CJ KH \^JaJ T@T  Heading 2$<@&56CJ\]^JaJV@V  Heading 3$<@&5CJOJQJ\^JaJDA@D Default Paragraph FontViV  Table Normal :V 44 la (k(No List :@:  Footnote TextCJ@&@@ Footnote ReferenceH*:>@: Title$a$5CJ \aJ6U@!6  Hyperlink >*B*ph^2@2^ List 2$$ 77x^7`a$OJQJmH sH u4 @B4 Footer  !.)@Q.  Page Number4@b4 Header  !HrH  Balloon TextCJOJQJ^JaJFV@F ZxFollowedHyperlink >*B* ph~= 6x4+4!%/'(*.R022M3!45 78;=e>9???@oC_DfE[F,G~I6J9KMOqQQsSW3Y\Z [ \ ]_Z`c%ddefgEhjk:l9nn_ppqruu4wwzI{{|~ لr@Ȇ<ғJƖr\?ڝLu.ɢʣ#WɩجQFMe+Fh5'$ m;- Fi.4z6 n}  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~#*w +  x 'h&9$@KH7=f IVl' Q w "l$$$%%%N%l%%''''0(())***+++(-x...m///Z0111 2)222 345y9K::A;;%<G<<=>?@@5AHAAqCDDEFGHEJzMMNNePP?RRRRS%S3SDSSSSST+TRT^UmVXY Y(YYRZp[[[]^u^_`}bQcccdd}Usz . !$%+,....L1M1l1 79;=]=@rC/G0G[GVHIZM+,\A x #qrĮzõĵ7hi23e<+6pq fgF G j  >S CJ )  K    "3$$%&&&'''G''9)))F*Y+++/---'.1.D.`..//0k11h2W3]445@5i5v56=888G9q99&;===">E>n>> ?@@@APAB"BCCCC2DDEHFGGHHHIzI7JJJ,KIKKK)L NORkSSaTTEUgUUV'WYYYUZhZ[\8]]^_&` aecff4ggii_kk ll5lElSldlll mm;mKmrm~noq8r@rHrrrsttt.v'wwx/y{q||}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000r0r0r0r000r0r0r0r0r0r0r00r0r0r0r0r0r0r0r0r0r0r0r0r00r0r00r0r0r0r0r0r0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0(@0@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>@0>00d@000@000@000@000@0@0@0@0@0@0@000r#st@z|=>ZM+,\A x #qfgF  >S CJ'9)/--D.`.8G9&;=> ?@@KK)L NOR'WY8]]&` aecfi_kdll{q|}}}K00K00dK00 K00K00K00 K00K00)K00K00K00K00K00K00K00K00 K00 K00 K00  K00K00K00K00K00K00K00̫K00K00K00<K00K00K000K0!"䬟K0!K0! 00dK00 $ K00K00fK00K00K00K00K00K00 K00K00 X/K00K00fK00K00K00K00x`<K00K00O?lhDK00 O?lhDK0 0  O?lhDK0 0 X K00K00 B*K00 @0 K00K00 O?lhDK00`<O?lhDK00`<6ߺ(K00f@0 00d %%%(!<s[sI]ɱ7or:m $(147>lBpF#JHNSV=\_akeXls}v|Ѕ65^+S.W;JZo|ͅЅυ  (!! *$#$X$7.8[8>?8?B'C?C(VKVXVZ[[[y\\\A_~__dXXXXXXXXXX8@0(  B S  ?billyboy+x}+x}w w Կw  w ̵ w  w 44 w w  w  w \ w ̴ w <w w w w w Tw w w w Tw w w w Tw w w w Tw w 4$w Tw w w w w Tw w w <w w D<w w w Tw  w , w Dyw yw w ğw < w | w w Tw w dw w w w $w dw w ,w lw w 4w tw w Dw w |w w w w  w Lw w čw w L:w :w :w  !w L!w !w LWw Ww Ww w w  w  w Lw w w w $w w  w Lw w w Dw w w  w  w T w  w | w  w  w < w w ܽ w  w \ w  w $ w dw w w Lw w w  w Lw =w =w 4>w t>w >w w w  w Lw w Dx w x!w x"w y#w Dy$w !%w !&w "'w \"(w ")w "*w 4+w t,w -w .w 4/w t0w 1w D2w 3w ĭ4w 5w D6w 7w D8w 9w :w ;w Dw ?w D@w TAw Bw Cw Dw TEw Fw Gw Hw TIw Jw Kw Lw TMw Nw Ow Pw TQw Rw Sw $Tw dUw Vw Ww $Xw dYw Zw [w $\w d]w ^w _w $`w daw B B >NVbgq&&???OO4T4TZZZ__i`i`cceeehhiimmmmmmqquujyjyXX``ܙܙVV{{ެެ>>O`mmBBw**SS||OO,,==p p ??z""?#$$$$$))11}2}2q3)4)444668>>AABBCCIIJJVV%V%VWW\Y\YZZm]m]^q^q^FaFaaabbbnnnnnnoo%o%orrwwN}N}}      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~K K LT\elw&&???OO=T=TZZZ``l`l`cceeehhiipmpmmmqquu{y{yaaccߙߙee~~GG!!^h~~EE--\\RR44EEy y BB""J#$$$$$))11223,4,444668>>AABBCCIIJJV V-V-VWW_Y_YZZ|]|]^^^OaOaaabbbnnnnno oo+o+orr%w%wW}W}}  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~B*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagscountry-region9*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsState8H*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsCity9*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsplace=C*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags PlaceName=E*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags PlaceType (HECCEHHHHH =!?!*%2%=)B)X,^,,,.. .".#.$.01o1t1556688<y===AABBBBC!CCCCDDDH H4I=IYL]L M*MQ|QST2T4TUU+W1WZZ(Z-Z2Z7ZKZNZH]T]]]P^Z^d^n^`!`AgEgggjjHoyox!x{{%|,|}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}  J     ""S$U$&&&&&'''%'&'T'W'''))))++b-e----%.)...3.B.F.^..//01111&2g2_44453575B5h5k5u5e8h888I9o999@;D;<y=====$>D>c>g>p>>> ?@@@@@@@A'A-AB!BCCCCC0DDDDE5E>EGGGHHHHHK+K.KHKLL+LMLNNQ|QmSS-T0T UUGUfUWW3W5WXXYYYYZZWZbZjZ[:]]:^<^^__%`aaccffffggh iiijjkl lll4l7lDlGlRlUlblflllll m mm.m1m>>>>>>>????@@@@@@DAFAABBBBBbEcEHHHHzIzIII7JJKKKKLLML N N N OQRR&W&W'W'WWjXXXXYYY[[[[\\:]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8^I^I^[^\^n^p^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^!aaccccccdd&d'd,d5d8d9dVdWdddddffiiDjjjjkLkOkQkRk]kll+l-ldllllllKmrmmmm n5nJnunxnzn|n}n}nnn,o,o-ooqqrrmspsttttttttv v!v&v*v+vwxxxxx+y-yyyyy{{{{{q|}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} <y=Q|QHoyo}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} |j}LΖ~Jh j^i ndHDVB]]'(D(ke(>m(u*TW+x]+&l,/%-c.C/N5/h/30O01a_1J26282A2F2T2V23%X3&T4f4,5y56\67_6 e6Ec7Ow7 8f@89/1:XW:n:/V;s;<\7=C=K=X=n=Pi?@N@2m@On@AlBjCwD8EbEuE*xEbF I&I`HICKImTI~IQJIJkJPuJ?KxKKLTLaLMMlMyMMNLN\N5|OPdPJmQwQrRTUYU/VFZVWT^WYHYQY\Z1[<[zC[J[I\Bl\;]^1^:^#=^U^U_?`??arAaxDa6b`bombWc~cc.d7dz3fq6fkf(g?NgNgig,hp2h>kh-%kck6lKl mBmzm n~n)ou4o_ZoypTp!qq?frUs7s0~stP'tu&AuvA,vPv w w_w6x \yzWz/{1{AW{^{z|r~7^xN9) ; i)(-`ugs'}+ H~P E NT\K|9LVd)W]-d" Ls)Q ;ab g yJy0UAnnp|5'nGVM Qoq?~2s'&Xa0Zx#:}h!6yQ&)Cm| . aU)OtvlnGFpi5&d%fv8neK- @FHXThpRxdB!]p9$9JOk~l &IY]s&JJ]M _QJA&bMe] lo+S`MheRCW,_i<XRLL[!xw+-HJ?HXb +2|gA`-V)C<FjAh2[t{gZ?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGIJKLMNOQRSTUVW\Root Entry FC^Data 1Table5WordDocument1SummaryInformation(HDocumentSummaryInformation8PCompObjq  FMicrosoft Office Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89qRoot Entry F0a^Data 1Table5WordDocument1      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGIJKLMNOibcdefgh՜.+,D՜.+,D hp|   \ DO YOU KNOW MY PARENTS Title 8@ _PID_HLINKSA<E.http://www.endeavourforum.org.au/oct04-04.htm]9http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3n3/nicholso.htmlk"Chttp://www.wa.democrats.org.au/people/greig/gayMarriageSpeech.htmlUVhttp://www.ilga.org/67 http://www.letsgetequal.org.au/e} 8http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/afrcpapers/funder.htmlBS -http://www.letsgetequal.org.au/alpletter.pdfBhttp://www.community.nsw.gov.au/documents/adoption_act_review.pdf&4$http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdfwf http://nla.gov.au/nla.arc-46167SummaryInformation(HDocumentSummaryInformation8aCompObjq