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Social Justice Report 2003

Chapter 4: Responding to petrol sniffing on the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Lands: A case study

In September 2002, the South Australian
Coroner brought down his findings in the inquests into the deaths of Kunmanara^[1] Ken (who died on 3 August 1999), Kunmanara Hunt (who died on 27 January
2001) and Kunmanara Thompson (who died on 26 June 2001). Each of these
young Anangu was a chronic petrol sniffer (they had been sniffing for
at least ten years) in their mid to late twenties living on the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Lands (AP Lands). All three were found to have died as
a result of inhalation of petrol fumes.^[2]

Indigenous community organisations on the
Pitjantjatjara lands had lobbied hard for the inquests to take place in
order to bring public attention to the devastating impact that petrol
sniffing was having on the AP Lands and to the lack of government action
in addressing the situation. The Coroner identified that socio-economic
factors such as hunger, poverty, illness, low education levels, almost
total unemployment, boredom and general feelings of hopelessness 'form
the environment in which such self-destructive behaviour takes place'.^[3] He stated: 'That such conditions should exist among a group of people
defined by race in the 21st century in a developed nation like Australia
is a disgrace and should shame us all'.^[4]

The Coroner identified the failure of governments
(both federal and state) to provide adequate services on the AP Lands
to address these factors as contributing to the problems associated with
and leading to petrol sniffing. The findings and recommendations of the
inquests provide a blue print for action in addressing issues relating
to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands within a systemic and long term framework.

In this chapter, I examine progress in implementing
the recommendations of the Coroner in the year since they were released.
It is critical for the South Australian and federal governments to respond
in a coordinated and timely manner to this most difficult, entrenched
and devastating issue. An analysis of how they have approached this task
and the processes that they have committed to is also of broader relevance
for addressing chronic substance misuse and petrol sniffing issues in
other Indigenous communities across Australia. The chapter commences with
an overview of research on the extent of petrol sniffing in Indigenous
communities across Australia and its impact on Indigenous communities.
It then discusses issues relating to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands and
the Coroner's findings, as well as considers the adequacy and appropriateness
of governmental responses and processes that are currently in train on
the AP Lands to deal with petrol sniffing issues.

Petrol sniffing and Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander communities

a) The impact of petrol sniffing on Indigenous communities

There are two main ways that petrol sniffing
impacts on Indigenous communities. First, at an individual level it can
be life-threatening and poses significant risks to health. It can also
result in increasing levels of disability. Second, it has disruptive and
destructive effects on the functioning of families and communities.

The impact of petrol sniffing on a person's
health has been described as follows:

Petrol is a mixture of C4 to C12 hydrocarbons,
the relative amounts of the various constituents depending on the origin
and preparation of the petrol. The unsaturated hydrocarbons have mild
anaesthetic properties while the saturated hydrocarbons have a narcotic
effect. The principle additive is tetraethyl lead which also has intoxicant
properties. Tetraethyl lead and its metabolites are highly neurotoxic.

Fifteen to 20 inhalations of petrol will
cause euphoria and intoxication for three to six hours. Prolonged inhalation
or rapid inhalation of a highly concentrated vapour, such as when petrol-soaked
cloth is held to the nose, may lead to violent excitement followed by
a loss of consciousness, coma or death. Organic lead toxicity is regarded
as the major long term health hazard of petrol sniffing, although some
other components (toluene, n-hexane) may contribute to neurological
damage ...

Other long term sequelae of chronic sniffing
include nutritional disturbances, anaemia, and cardiac, liver and renal
effects. Cognitive functioning may also be impaired and there is evidence
that some of these changes are irreversible.^[5]

The South Australian Coroner also describes
the risks to the health of sniffers as follows:

Individuals who sniff petrol are at a
high risk of pneumonia and chronic lung disease; trauma; burns and injury.
In addition there have been some deaths in which sudden death has clearly
occurred during acute episodes of inhalation. These deaths may be related
to cardiac arrythmias, respiratory arrest because of acute effects on
the brain stem or cerebral oedema ...

Lead toxicity of the brain is clearly
well established in the literature and has been a major cause of brain
damage related to petrol sniffing. However there are significant data
now suggesting that aromatic hydrocarbons (eg benzene) are also responsible
for neurotoxicity.^[6]

Petrol sniffing can also be a significant
cause of physical disablement, necessitating full-time attendant care.
The Northern Territory Parliament's Select Committee on Substance Abuse
in the Community noted earlier this year that:

The direct impact of inhalant abuse is
usually contained to the sniffer and family and immediate community.
However, it has implications for the broader community also. The end
result of petrol sniffing other than early death is brain damage which
leaves the sniffer in a vegetative state. A conservative estimate of
the cost to the NT of maintaining an ex-sniffer in this state is $150,000
pa. While there are presently 15 such persons in central Australia,
it is estimated that this could escalate to upwards of 60 in the near
future, an ongoing (and growing) cost of $9m per annum. These figures
argue strongly for action to curb the practice and stem the damage now.^[7]

In his findings of the coronial inquests
on petrol sniffing on the AP lands, Coroner Chivell outlines the social
impacts of petrol sniffing, specifically on the Anangu population, as
follows:

Petrol sniffing poses a range of problems
to sniffers, their families, communities and to the wider society. Among
the problems which have been associated with petrol sniffing are: serious
health consequences including death or long-term brain damage, social
alienation of sniffers, social disruption, vandalism and violence, increased
inter-family conflict and reduced morale on communities, incarceration
of sniffers and costs to the health system in terms of acute care and
providing for the long-term disabled ...^[8]

In her earlier work, Maggie Brady states
that: 'it is not possible to provide an unequivocal answer to the question
of whether "Aboriginal people" define petrol sniffing to be a problem.' ^[9] However, evidence to the recent Coronial Inquests
on the AP Lands makes clear that the Anangu certainly perceive petrol
sniffing as a devastating contemporary problem facing their communities.
One community member commented at the Inquest:

...they create endless trouble for us and
it just goes on and on. What I would really like to do is to help them
stop but - I love them and would care for them but the problem is with
their sniffing they start to not be able to understand properly so I
can't even intervene because they can't understand what I am on about
anyway.^[10]

In his findings the Coroner also stated
that:

Many attempts over the years to combat
petrol sniffing [on the AP Lands] have been unsuccessful. Anangu continue
to try and care for sniffers even when they continue to sniff, and even
after they are violent and disruptive to their families and the community.
Some Anangu are concerned that if they try and stop sniffers they will
harm them, or that the sniffers may harm themselves. They look to the
broader community to help them deal with a problem which has no precedent
in traditional culture.^[11]

b) Recent concern about petrol sniffing in Indigenous
communities

In the year since these Coronial inquests,
there has been significant concern expressed about petrol sniffing in
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities at the national level.
In October 2003, the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee
made the following recommendation in the report of its inquiry into national
progress towards reconciliation:

The Committee recommends that during the
Spring sitting 2004 the Senate refer to it an inquiry on progress in
addressing the problems surrounding petrol sniffing in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
lands, including progress as it relates to the COAG whole of government
trial conducted there.^[12]

The Dissenting Report of Government members
of the Committee questioned such a distinct focus on addressing the issue
on the AP Land. Instead, their Dissenting Report proposed that recommendation
20 of the committee (quote above) be amended to:

In its submission to the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs' Inquiry
into Capacity-building, the Aboriginal Land Rights Movement (ALRM) of
South Australia recommended that the Social Justice Commissioner monitor
the implementation of the recommendations of the recent coronial inquests
on the AP Lands:

In March 2003, the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs also released the report
of its inquiry into substance abuse in Australian communities. It noted
that the use of inhalants such as petrol and aerosols was relatively rare
in the Australian community, but nevertheless was a matter of concern
to the committee due to the serious impact of inhaling and its prevalence
among particularly disadvantaged groups such as Indigenous people.^[15] The Committee recommended that:

The issue of petrol sniffing in Indigenous
communities has also been raised as an issue in recent parliamentary inquiries
in Victoria and the Northern Territory (discussed further below).

c) Information about petrol sniffing
by Indigenous people

These processes have identified the need
for greater attention to be paid to petrol sniffing, including at the
national level, and for more urgent responses to it where it exists. The
phenomenon of petrol-sniffing is, however, not well-understood and there
is no reliable national data on the number of people involved and the
extent of resulting damage to individuals and communities. Peter d'Abbs
and Maggie Brady have noted that:

In fact, petrol sniffing in Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander communities continues to occupy a marginal position
as a drug issue at the national level:

As an issue for Australian drug policy,
indigenous petrol sniffing is all but invisible. The National Drug Strategic
Framework 1998-99 to 2002-03, endorsed by the Ministerial Council on
Drug Strategy in November 1998, makes just two references to the issue.
The first is to tell us that we don't know anything about its prevalence
(among Indigenous Australians) ... The second reference, in effect, states
that petrol sniffing is not good for you ...

Similarly, the National Action Plan on
Illicit Drugs 2001 to 2002-03, endorsed by the Ministerial Council on
Drug Strategy in July 2000 skirts around the issue of inhalants by stating
that they would be covered by a separate 'complementary' strategy ... for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander drug issues. A background paper
prepared to accompany the National Action Plan includes a section titled
'Illicit drug use among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples'
which makes no reference to inhalants, volatile substances or petrol
sniffing.^[18]

Compared to the information available on
other categories of substance misuse, d'Abbs and Brady suggest that "the
vast untapped pool of professional expertise" [on petrol sniffing] looks
somewhat shallow ...' ^[19] Paul Torzillo has
commented that 'the lack of any sustained institutional interest in petrol
sniffing among government agencies is matched by a dearth of high quality
research.' ^[20] Consistent with this, there
is a lack of systematic and comprehensive data on the extent, location
and changes over time in petrol sniffing in Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander communities.

There are, however, reported instances of
petrol sniffing as a significant issue in several Indigenous communities
across Australia. In its recent report into the inhalation of volatile
substances, the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee of the Victorian
Parliament summarised some published materials as follows:

Petrol sniffing occurs in some Indigenous
communities and not others. In 1989 it was reported as occurring mainly
in Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory, in central Australia ... and
in the Riverina region of New South Wales. In 1994, Brady and Torzillo
argued that patterns had changed:

It appears that the intensity of sniffing
has increased over the past 20 years, with more users sniffing over
longer periods, which has resulted in an increase in reported morbidity
and mortality from the 1980s onward.

However, since 1994 a further shift in
patterns and prevalence of petrol sniffing seems to have occurred. A
little-publicised but positive development of recent years has been
the move by many Indigenous communities to use aviation fuel rather
than petrol for vehicles. In several communities where a long and established
history of petrol sniffing has existed, sniffing has been reduced or
even stopped. Conversely, some communities which had previously been
free of petrol sniffing are now reporting the practice. It has been
reported in the Katherine region of the NT, Cape York in Queensland,
south-west Queensland, western NSW and Northern Victoria. There is also
evidence that Indigenous children are turning to the use of other volatile
substances. Although petrol sniffing remains the primary form of volatile
substance misuse among young Indigenous children, there are increasing
reports of other forms (particularly glue and aerosol paint sniffing)
in urban areas.^[21]

The Victorian parliamentary committee report
also refers to studies identifying petrol sniffing by Indigenous youth
as an issue in Perth. While acknowledging that there is very little research
on the situation in Victoria, it also states that 'it is believed that
chroming is a far more prevalent form of volatile substance abuse in Victoria,
including among Indigenous Victorians, than petrol sniffing. It may be
that this is an erroneous assumption.' ^[22]

Petrol sniffing has also been identified
as a 'major problem' among young Aboriginal people in recent years on
Cape York Peninsula in the communities of Kowanyama, Aurukum, Napranum
and Lockhart River; and as existing 'periodically and to a lesser extent'
in northern Cape York towns such as Mapoon, Injinoo, Umagico, Bamaga and
New Mapoon.^[23] The Queensland government
has also stated that 'petrol and aerosol sniffing are two of the most
common kinds of substance abuse in Torres Strait Islander communities ...
For some families, petrol and aerosol sniffing is an even bigger issue
than grog abuse.'^[24]

There are also reports that petrol sniffing
is periodically an issue faced in remote Aboriginal communities in Western
Australia. Concern was recently expressed that petrol sniffing may have
been a contributing factor in three deaths in the past two years at Balgo;^[25] and the Shire of Ngaanyatjarraku and community of Warburton have also
recently expressed concerns about 'chronic substance abuse' and difficulties
in law and justice responses to it.^[26]

In its interim report on issues of alcohol
abuse, cannabis use and inhalant abuse, a Select Committee of the Northern
Territory Parliament noted in February 2003 that:

In remote Central communities it is estimated
that there are up to 350 'sniffers'. Sniffing is an endemic practice
in at least six remote Central Australian communities.^[27]

The limited research also suggests
that there are different patterns of use of petrol and other volatile
substances by Indigenous people compared to non-Indigenous people. The
Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee of the Victorian Parliament notes
the following findings of several studies:

• A survey of Indigenous and non-Indigenous students in
  Perth showed that Indigenous users of volatile substances tended to
  use much more regularly, often on a daily basis and over a longer period
  of time than non-Indigenous users; and that petrol was one of the predominant
  solvents used (unlike for non-Indigenous youth);
• Other studies have found that Indigenous youth are likely
  to use inhalants more intensively and for a longer duration than non-Indigenous
  urban youth, with one study reporting a mean duration of eight years
  for petrol sniffing (compared with only a brief period of experimentation
  for most non-Indigenous youth); and
• a further study has argued that there are differences
  in inhalation culture and practices for Indigenous people depending
  on locality / remoteness. Relevant factors which influence this include
  the degree of community cohesion, local traditions, customs and the
  degree of cultural identification, the number of volatile substance
  abusers, access to resources and support, and other local factors.^[28]

In 2001, the Australian National Council
on Drugs published a report examining the structural determinants of substance
abuse. It states that petrol sniffing and volatile substance abuse by
young Indigenous people, while clearly having some similarities with non-Indigenous
people, must be viewed as part of a broader picture of Indigenous disadvantage:

When combined with an environment stressed
by poverty, racism and frequent bereavement, some remote Aboriginal
communities have been beset by petrol sniffing among their young people.
Indigenous communities with a history of involvement in the cattle industry
were found by Brady to have resisted solvent-sniffing problems. This
resilience was attributed to the independence, self-esteem and outlet
for risk-taking afforded by involvement in the cattle industry. Individuals
who had adopted Christianity or who valued other activities such as
sport or fishing were also found to be resilient to sniffing solvents.
Brady concluded that social and cultural factors are paramount in solving
youth health problems such as solvent sniffing in Aboriginal communities.^[29]

d) Defining petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities
as a public policy issue

In her landmark 1989 publication Heavy
Metal: the Social Meaning of Petrol Sniffing in Australia, Maggie
Brady raises the question of how petrol sniffing is defined as a problem.
She observes that while '[p]etrol sniffing by young people, often in groups,
constitutes a threat, both physically and metaphorically to the social
order', it is one among 'many behaviours that lead to impaired health
and social functioning'.^[30] Certainly other
forms of addictive behaviour such as tobacco and alcohol addiction constitute
more widespread sources of death and disease across Indigenous populations.

With Peter d'Abbs, Maggie Brady has recently
commented on how petrol sniffing makes its way onto the public policy
agenda:

Petrol sniffing erupts periodically into
the living rooms or onto the breakfast tables of the public through
highly sensational media exposes ... The media portrayal of Aboriginal
petrol sniffing is worthy of a study in its own right; in particular,
one might ask why acts of petrol sniffing are implicitly - and sometimes
explicitly - represented not merely as instances of individual self-harm,
but as evidence of a broader community social disintegration in a way
that heroin use, for example, is never portrayed. ^[31]

d'Abbs and Brady argue that this is indicative
of structural problems in the way governments address issues of petrol
sniffing in Indigenous communities. They argue that because of the lack
of reliable data and the 'absence of any powerful lobby groups or other
agencies with the capacity to ensure that petrol sniffing remains on the
public agenda in anything more than a transient manner', petrol sniffing
as a public issue 'owes almost everything to media outbursts ... what pressure
for action that exists as a result is for quick, short term action'. ^[32]

They argue that due to pressures to
deal with other, chronic health issues in Indigenous communities combined
with petrol sniffing not being a major contributor to indigenous morbidity
or mortality, bureaucrats are more often than not pre-occupied with other
health priorities. When there is media attention to the issue, they 'find
themselves caught in a crossfire: pressured from outside ... to take action
in response to a problem that is not, from where they sit, among their
most critical challenges.' ^[33] d'Abbs and
Brady see three inter-related consequences of this:

• first, the agency will take some action but not be willing
  to divert resources from other areas that are seen as ongoing priorities;
• second, the pressure to return to what are seen internally
  as more important priorities provides an incentive to make a one off
  gesture and refocus on other issues; and
• third, there is unlikely to be within the agency or department
  much experience or networks of people with an ongoing interest in keeping
  petrol sniffing high on the agenda of priorities.^[34]

Petrol sniffing is therefore unlikely to
become the subject of a long-term, sustained policy focus:

[B]ecause petrol sniffing is not seen
as a genuine on-going priority issue that falls neatly into any one
department's or even one government's scope of responsibility, governments
have tended not to engage in direct service provision, but rather to
fund community-based groups and other non-government organisations to
provide services. This, of course, also fits with the view of petrol
sniffing as a community responsibility .... [I]n light of petrol sniffing's
low ranking as a priority, most initiatives have been funded on an ad
hoc, short term basis, with virtually no commitment to rigorous evaluation
or to providing ongoing funding to those programs that demonstrate successful
outcomes.^[35]

In these circumstances, it is difficult
to consolidate an evidence base, to build and sustain links with existing
expertise, or to maintain extensive corporate knowledge on the subject.
By identifying petrol sniffing as an 'Indigenous problem' it has also
been marginalised as a policy issue, with the result that it has not received
the attention and resourcing that it may have if it had been positioned
within mainstream substance misuse policy frameworks. Accordingly, D'Abbs
and Brady comment that governments have tended to establish interagency
committees as the main response to petrol sniffing:

Petrol sniffing on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands:
A case study

a) Why a case study of the AP Lands?

In the second half of 2003, the Social Justice
Commissioner's unit of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
(HREOC) conducted a research and consultation project into progress in
addressing the Coronial recommendations on petrol sniffing on the AP Lands.
HREOC staff visited the AP Lands as part of this project in September
2003. Interviews and meetings were conducted in Adelaide and across the
AP Lands with various government agencies (including those involved in
the Council of Australian Government's whole-of-government community coordination
trial on the AP Lands),^[37] Aboriginal organisations,^[38] and community members and elders on the lands.^[39] HREOC also received a whole-of-government response from the South Australian
government to the issues being considered.

The decision to conduct a case study specifically
on petrol sniffing on the AP Lands was based on a number of factors. The
Social Justice Commissioner's office had been considering for some time
ways that it might best be able to assist communities on the AP Lands
to address problems associated with petrol sniffing. This was largely
the result of concerns raised with HREOC by organisations such as the
NPY Women's Council about petrol sniffing.^[40]

Similarly, the inquests conducted on the
AP Lands in 2002 had provided much impetus for addressing petrol sniffing
issues. The recommendations of the Inquests provide 'a blueprint for government
to consider as the means best able to address the problems and provide
the most likely long-term solutions.'^[41] There is a clear need for expediency in following up the recommendations.
This is particularly so given that the tardiness of government and other
players in addressing petrol sniffing to date has been identified by the
Anangu themselves, as well as by the Coroner, as a contributory factor
to the escalation and embeddedness of the situation on the AP Lands.

In the absence of systematic and comprehensive
data on the extent and nature of petrol sniffing by Indigenous people,
there is also much potential value in provide a discrete focus on the
AP Lands in order to secure a higher policy profile for the issue of petrol
sniffing. The AP Lands are also one of the areas across the country where
there is some data on petrol sniffing and a history of dealing with the
issue, as Nganampa Health Council has collated such information since
1984.

As a case study, the AP Lands Coronial Inquest
also has currency in light of recent policy debate about the need to address
urgent problems in communities (drug and alcohol misuse, violent behaviour)
versus the need to focus on the underlying causes of family and community
dysfunction (inter-related social, economic, cultural and psychological
factors) in overcoming Indigenous disadvantage. While the Coronial Inquest
endorses a systematic, concerted approach to the AP Lands situation, indications
are that interventions into petrol sniffing will need to be adapted to
meet the needs of specific contexts:

An important aspect of the Coroner's findings and recommendations
is his recognition that petrol sniffing is such a complex problem
or indeed series of problems to be faced by outback communities, that
no individual measure will 'fix it', rather there needs to be a series
of measures all operating synergistically together to have any prospect
of long term success. For that reason alone progress should be monitored.^[42]

[I]t's the biggest shame that young people today in
this part of the world are dying from petrol sniffing. And the neglect
that I think has happened, has been going on for some time and that
there is a reluctance for the wider community in Australia to take
any responsibility or concern about it ... well let's be honest, there's
been 30 years of neglect from government in this region across the
whole board, not just petrol sniffing. But I do believe that if you
address the issues of petrol sniffing, you're addressing the wider
issues of the problems on the communities. It goes hand in hand. And
you know, we have documented time and time and time again - communities
have, the women have - that what is needed. We don't need more reports,
we don't need more enquiries, we don't need more meetings with the
government to say, 'What do you want'. Anangu have written it down
time and time again.^[45]

[T]he median age of petrol sniffers has
increased markedly over this time and that in many communities the number
of petrol sniffers over 25 years of age are in the majority. This means
that a number of those who took up petrol sniffing 10, 15 or 20 years
ago are still sniffing. This cohort effect has major implications for
understanding the breadth of problems that occurs as a consequence of
petrol sniffing and the different interventions that would be required.^[49]

c) The findings of the Coronial Inquests into petrol
sniffing, September 2002

Coroner Chivell concluded in the Coronial Inquests conducted
on the AP Lands that the situation in 2002 is that:

Petrol sniffing is endemic on the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara lands. It has caused and continues to cause devastating
harm to the community, including approximately 35 deaths in the last
20 years in a population of between 2,000 and 2,500. Serious disability,
crime, cultural breakdown and general grief and misery are also the
consequences.^[50]

The first recommendation of the Coroner in the inquest reflects
the serious contemporary impact of petrol sniffing on the community:

1. That Commonwealth, State and Territory
Governments recognise that petrol sniffing poses an urgent threat to
the very substance of the Anangu communities on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Lands. It threatens not only death and serious and permanent disability,
but also the peace, order and security of communities, cultural and
family structures, education, health and community development.^[51]

A summary of the findings of the Coroner
and his recommendations for action have been extracted as an appendix
to this report (see Appendix 3). A key finding of the Coroner was that
the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in
Custody have not been complied with by the Commonwealth or state governments,
and that this 'will, if it is not addressed, lead to severe disability
and further deaths, not to mention continuing social dislocation, crime,
loss of culture and general community degradation and loss'^[52] on the AP Lands. The concerns of the Coroner regarding this are also extracted
in Appendix 3.

The findings and recommendations of the Coroner can be grouped
into the following two key issues:

• i) Coordination, funding and action by Government: Concerns were expressed about the failure of governments to consult
  appropriately and significant delay in implementing programs, with a
  need for governments to move beyond the 'information gathering' stage.
  The Inquest highlights the need for governments to re-assess their coordination
  of policy and funding approaches to service delivery on the AP Lands;
• ii) Specific interventions for addressing petrol sniffing: The Inquest identifies the need to adopt a combination of primary,
  secondary and tertiary interventions relating to health and justice
  issues in order to combat petrol sniffing, combined with strategies
  to address the significant disadvantage and lack of services on the
  AP Lands, which forms the environment in which petrol sniffing takes
  place.

The Coronial Inquest recognised the need
for broader government and community responsibility, and made a series
of recommendations (Recs 1-7; 8.14, 8.15) urging re-assessment of current
Commonwealth and State funding and policy strategies in finding solutions
to the problem of petrol sniffing in the AP Lands. The recommendations
directed towards the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments included
the need to:

• recognise the threat which petrol sniffing poses to Anangu
  communities on the AP Lands (Rec 1);
• recognise the role played by broader socio-economic factors
  in causing petrol sniffing on the AP Lands (Rec 2);
• recognise the responsibility of government and the broader
  Australian community to address petrol sniffing (Rec 3);
• move existing intergovernmental approaches beyond the
  information-gathering stage and to utilise existing knowledge and expertise
  to find solutions to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands forthwith (Rec
  4);
• address existing fragmentation of service delivery through
  improved inter-governmental coordination (Rec 5);
• establish a more substantial Commonwealth and state government
  presence on the AP Lands and develop more stable relationships with
  Anangu, including greater certainty of funding arrangements (Rec 6);
• recruit qualified and experienced staff to the AP Lands
  (Rec 8.11);
• recognise the interdependent nature of program interventions
  and adopt a longer term, multi-faceted approach to addressing petrol
  sniffing (Rec's 7, 8.14); and
• assess initiatives against the recommendations of the
  Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Rec 8.15).

The remaining recommendations address more
specifically the different levels of interventions needed from prevention
and deterrence through to rehabilitation. Recommendations which have become
the responsibility of health agencies include:

• appointing four youth-workers and a youth-work coordinator
  (Rec 8.1);
• Assessing petrol sniffers on a neurological and neuro-physical
  basis for rehabilitation and disability services (Rec 8.2);
• Establishing a culturally appropriate Homelands/Outstations
  Programme (Rec 8.3);
• Continuing funding for the Commonwealth Avgas initiative
  (Rec 8.4);
• Evaluating the role of the Department of Families and
  Youth Services (SA) in relation to children at risk on the AP Lands,
  including considering the adoption of a more proactive community development
  approach (Rec 8.8); and
• Urgent upgrading of the level of services for disabled
  victims of petrol sniffing (Rec 8.9).

Justice issues covered by the recommendations
relate to strengthening of the police presence in the AP Lands and the
need for greater deterrence of petrol sniffing and related disruptive
behaviours. They include:

• Increasing the range of sentencing options available
  to courts sitting on the AP Lands, resourcing non-custodial options
  such as outstations and a secure care facility, as well as increasing
  the presence of Correctional Service supervisors to ensure that undertakings,
  bonds and community service orders can be enforced (Rec 8.5);
• Amending the Public Intoxication Act to extend
  its application to the AP Lands and declare petrol or hydrocarbons a
  drug for the purposes of the Act (Rec 8.6);
• Canvassing support for the establishment of night patrols
  as part of an overall crime prevention strategy on the AP Lands (Rec
  8.7);
• Planning for the establishment of secure care facilities
  on the AP Lands, to fulfil a range of roles including detention, detoxification,
  treatment and rehabilitation (Rec 8.10);
• Immediate establishment of a police presence on the AP
  Lands, through implementation of the recommendations of the SAPOL review
  of the Community Constable Scheme (Rec 8.12); and
• Improvement to existing levels of policing on the AP
  Lands, through addressing issues relating to staffing at Marla (Rec
  8.13).

Progress in responding to the recommendations of
the Coronial Inquest into petrol sniffing on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Lands

In this section, progress in addressing
the recommendations of the Coronial Inquest is considered in relation
to the following four themes:

• Inter-governmental and inter-agency coordination;
• Resourcing issues;
• Health related issues; and
• Justice related issues.^[53]

a) Inter-governmental and Inter-agency coordination

Fundamental to the recommendations made
by the Coroner is the observation that government agencies have been stuck
for too long in the information-gathering stage at the expense of taking
action to address longstanding service delivery issues confronting the
AP Lands:

There is no need for further information
gathering, and there is a vast untapped pool of professional expertise
to be utilised. What is missing is prompt, forthright, properly planned,
properly funded action.^[54]

The Coroner recognised that properly planned
and funded action is reliant on the development of an '[i]nter-Governmental
coordination of approach ... in order to avoid the fragmentation of effort
and confusion and alienation of service-providers'.^[55] He also stipulated that the support of the broader community be enlisted
in addressing petrol sniffing on the AP Lands:

The fact that the wider Australian community
has a responsibility to assist Anangu to address the problem of petrol
sniffing, which has no precedent in traditional culture, is clear. Governments
should not approach the task on the basis that the solutions must come
from Anangu communities alone.^[56]

The need for interagency coordination or
holistic or whole-of-government approaches, and the need to avoid duplication
of services and to target Indigenous disadvantage more effectively, have
become familiar themes in policy debate on Indigenous service delivery.
The necessity of changing the ways in which governments do business with
Indigenous communities has particular pertinence in light of the recent
focus of Indigenous policy on capacity-building and governance.^[57]

Since the Coronial Inquest, one of the most
consistent comments made about the inter-agency approach to the Coroner's
recommendations by those whom HREOC consulted with is that it has continued
to be piecemeal rather than systematic and has been characterised by a
reluctance to take action. In the words of one community organisation
member, 'there have been many references to the Coroner's recommendations
but a failure to act'. In response, government officials often highlight
the difficulties in making progress on petrol sniffing-related issues
on the AP Lands, given the long-standing and intractable nature of the
problems, and the need to consult properly and effectively with Anangu.

This section of the chapter will address
concerns in regard to the question of the degree of responsibility to
be exercised by both Anangu and government in responding to the Coronial
recommendations.

• Government coordination of policies and programmes

It is necessary to begin with some background
on the history and composition of the coalitions of government agencies
responding to petrol sniffing and related service delivery issues on the
AP Lands. Recommendation 4 of the Coronial Inquest identifies the major
government avenues for coordination of services and action in addressing
petrol sniffing:

The Commonwealth Government, through the
Central Australian Cross Border Reference Group [CBRG], and the South
Australian Government through the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-Governmental
Inter-Agency Collaboration Committee [APLIICC], should accelerate their
efforts to find solutions to these issues and get beyond the 'information
gathering' phase forthwith. They should use the extensive knowledge,
published material and professional expertise that is already available.^[58]

The Coroner had acknowledged that the establishment
of bodies such as the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-Governmental Inter-Agency
Collaboration Committee (or APLIICC Tier One & Tier 2 committees) and
the Central Australian Cross Border Reference Group (or CBRG) was met
with a generally favourable response.^[59] He noted, however, that there were concerns that resources are not making
a significant difference to the lives of people on the AP Lands. The APLIICC
(also known as 'Tier One') was established in August 2000 by the previous
South Australian state government in order to facilitate a cross-portfolio
commitment of senior executives at State and Commonwealth levels to respond
to disadvantage in the region, particularly issues such as the persistence
of poor health and impoverished conditions on the AP Lands despite the
level of expenditure on services.^[60]

Tier One of the APLIICC comprises a core
group of chief executives from the state government, APY Land Council,
Nganampa Health Council and the Commonwealth Department for Health and
Ageing. Originally, there was a second tier of working groups composed
of senior project and policy officers from state and commonwealth agencies
based in Adelaide who were responsible for implementing the directives
of Tier One. This has since been replaced by a series of task forces that
are to implement projects and activities identified as Tier One priorities.
There was also a Petrol Sniffing Task Force (PSTF), established in November
2001 by the previous SA Minister for Aboriginal Affairs to tackle petrol
sniffing specifically, which has since been subsumed into the activities
of the Tier One Committee.

There are two further groups with Commonwealth
and state representation to address issues emerging from the Ngaanyatjaraa
Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara cross border region which straddles the
Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia. The Central
Australian Cross Border Reference Group on Volatile Substance Abuse (CBRG)
was established in response to the findings of a review of Commonwealth
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Substance Misuse Programs in 1999.
A cross-jurisdictional forum was held in Adelaide on 20 March 2001, which
agreed to address the issue of improving coordination in the delivery
of volatile substance use through the establishment of a tri-state reference
group (the CBRG), who would have carriage of the implementation and monitoring
of the framework to address volatile substance abuse in the area.

The NPY Lands Tri-Jurisdictional Justice
Group was established in early 2003 to examine legislation and policies
that will enable the courts and police to operate across borders in order
to establish collaborative mechanisms and infrastructure to police the
NPY Lands. The working group includes representatives from police, justice,
health, education, Aboriginal Affairs agencies and local government. In
addition to commissioning a study on the demographics of the region (population
breakdown, movement patterns, offending and prison population data, language
profiles and so forth), the group aims to develop a coordinated approach
to shared facilities and programs, including culturally appropriate early
release and rehabilitation programs (including community detention options),
the potential establishment of a low security detention/alternative facility
in Alice Springs or on the Lands, and the possible use of the Alice Springs
Correctional Centre by WA and SA.

Since the Coronial Inquest, the AP Lands
have also been designated as the South Australian trial site for the Council
of Australian Government's (COAG) whole-of-government, whole-of-community
trials. The APLIICC has been chosen to provide the interface between government
and the communities on the AP Lands. In the joint media release announcing
the nomination of the AP Lands as a trial site, the SA Minister for Aboriginal
Affairs and Reconciliation Terry Roberts states:

This trial will build on positive initiatives
already under way on the AP Lands, such as the work of the AP Lands
Inter-government Inter-agency Collaboration Committee (Tier One), of
which the South Australian Government, the Commonwealth, ATSIC and AP
Council are all members.^[61]

The AP Lands were identified by the South
Australian government as an appropriate focus for the COAG trial because
of the level of need in the area, the existence of the APLIICC as a structure
to facilitate the trial and the compatibility of its aims with those of
COAG.

In early September 2003, there was a meeting
(the 'Shared Responsibility' workshop) in Alice Springs of government
and community representatives which sought to set priorities for the COAG
trial. The two priorities which were nominated for action were Mai
Wiru, a stores policy program addressing issues of nutrition, pricing
and stores management training, and rural transaction centres, a project
to establish permanent facilities in each major community for banking,
government agencies and service providers.

Another significant decision included agreement
that an Allocation Committee consisting of nominees from Community Councils,
Homelands Groups, Nganampa Health and APY Women's Group be established.
This fifteen member committee is to be chaired by the Chairperson of the
APY Land Council and is to assist in the disbursement of funds. This decision
aims to ensure that all stakeholders will have a clear understanding of
the funding situation for the AP Lands, as well as a say in the distribution
of monies on the Lands. The Allocation Committee will also work in conjunction
with the State Government in considering budget bids for future years.
The APY Land Council will be given additional financial support for their
role in assisting the Allocation Committee.

To support these new arrangements an Office
of the APY Lands has been established within the SA Department for Aboriginal
Affairs and Reconciliation, which will include a liaison person on the
Lands to work with the APY Executive and then to develop relationships
with Aboriginal communities. This initiative responds to Recommendation
6 from the Coronial Inquest which directed Commonwealth and State Governments
to establish a presence in the region, 'if not on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Lands then at least in Alice Springs, of senior trusted officials',^[62] and to criticism made by the Coroner that too much of the bureaucratic
activity was Adelaide or Canberra-based. The liaison person is to be well-briefed
in order to deal with a range of issues. There is a perceived need to
discuss with APY Land Council Executive what appropriate liaison with
communities would constitute - to take a partnership approach rather than
to impose a structure.

Canberra and Adelaide-based bureaucrats
from the Cross-Border Reference Groups have also made attempts to spend
time defining their relationship with the APY Executive. Officials also
acknowledged the need to learn how to work with local Indigenous governance
structures, time frames and ways of doing business, and that maintaining
continuity of staff over time was a significant issue, as well as the
development of longer-term relationships and processes in order to bring
about lasting change on the AP Lands. They noted the need to consult appropriately
with Anangu and the need for adequate time in which to conduct culturally-appropriate
consultations:

While an appropriate consultation process
takes time and can be seen to delay the introduction of urgently needed
resources, it is considered vital to successful work in the APY Lands. ^[63]

The South Australian government also has
allocated funds to support a series of initiatives on the AP Lands, including
$76,000 towards implementing an improvement in road planning projects
with ongoing planning assistance; $155,000 to commence a three-year program
for redeveloping the arts centres in the region; $200,000 to support programs
for the removal of feral animals from Indigenous owned protected areas
and to enhance native plants and animals; and programs aimed at developing
mining activity on the Lands, particularly in working with traditional
owners from APY to identify exploration opportunities on the land, and
in facilitating opportunities such as a youth geotechnical traineeship
scheme.

It is also anticipated that the allocation
of $2 million over four years for the Department of Administrative and
Information Services to provide staff housing on the AP Lands will assist
in responding to the establishment of a state and commonwealth government
presence in the region. Options for duplex style housing have been recommended
to the Tier One Committee and have been approved for tender.

A critical issue for the APLIICC / COAG
trial process as the major interface between government and AP Lands communities
is whether it will have the capacity to overcome some of the previous
issues of coordination facing the various committees (i.e, Tier One, CBRG
and PSTF) in order to facilitate a more effective approach to tackling
the problem of petrol sniffing. That is, whether these interagency structures
and processes will be able to provide a different way of working with
Anangu.

Related to this question are issues concerning
the representation of the Anangu and their level of participation in identifying
and progressing solutions. Consideration also needs to be given to the
question of whether it is possible to change the way governments do business
with communities or whether policy-making and bureaucratic processes inevitably
foreclose the potential to make progress on an issue such as petrol-sniffing
on the AP Lands.

• A different way of doing business?

The COAG whole-of-government trials, of
which the AP Lands are a trial site, are being piloted to develop a whole-of-government,
whole-of-community approach to capacity-building and governance issues
in designated areas across the country. Shared Responsibility, Shared
Future, the information pamphlet for participating communities, describes
the purpose of the COAG trials in the following terms:

Many people are saying that the relationship
between the community and the governments has got to change. It is clear
that some of the ways that governments and communities approach their
responsibilities needs to be done differently if we are going to move
forward together.

Recently, Commonwealth and State and Territory
governments have agreed to improve their approach. They have agreed
to work together .... And they have agreed to work in partnership with
Indigenous communities to support them find and manage sustainable solutions
to local problems. This means government have agreed to learn new ways
of doing business with Indigenous communities^[64]

Similar comments were made at the Inquest
by Albert Barelds, the Executive Manager of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Lands Project Team, who said that both commonwealth and state governments
have acknowledged that there is:

A need for a different way of working
with Anangu; there is a clear understanding that what government has
undertaken to date has not led to the lifestyle, the improvements that
were anticipated. In order to do so, it was felt that a different way
of working with Anangu is needed and therefore a number of initiatives
were taken to talk with both the Anangu Pitjantjatjara and elected members
of all the community councils, as well as the service providers, to
communicate directly with the Anangu to see how a new relationship between
government and Anangu could be built to improve their situation.^[65]

The broader policy context for the COAG
trials is the federal government's emphasis on mutual obligation and the
responsibility of all players (government, communities, families and individuals)
to address issues of social and economic participation that has featured
in its welfare reform package and practical reconciliation approach to
Indigenous issues. It is also aligned with an emphasis on self-empowerment
and self-management in contrast to the perceived 'failure' of self-determination
and the rights agenda to bring about change to Indigenous peoples' socio-economic
circumstances.

One of the challenges for this policy framework
is achieving an appropriate and equitable balance of responsibilities
between all participating parties. The federal Minister for Indigenous
Affairs in 2002 described this challenge as follows:

The key to this initiative is that neither
governments nor Indigenous communities can do it all on their own. We
must work together, work in partnership and share responsibility for
improving outcomes and building the capacity of people in communities
to manage their own affairs.^[66]

Government departments participating in
the COAG trial on the AP Lands have emphasised their need to develop culturally-appropriate
structures and processes, and to learn how to work with local Indigenous
governance arrangements, time-frames and ways of doing business. As discussed
above, the APLIICC Tier One / COAG process has given a substantial role
to the APY Executive as the gateway to local Indigenous communities and
groups in consultation and decision-making processes, including those
relating to the allocation of funds for activities on the Lands. This
approach has been taken in the interests of supporting Indigenous self-empowerment
and participation, with joint agreement to be reached with the APY Executive
on outcomes, and support for Anangu by the bureaucracy with grants and
services through this structure.

However, concerns have been raised about
the appropriateness of representative structures for Anangu to date in
this process, particularly in regard to the level of responsibility given
to APY Executive. While government departments and agencies present the
APLIICC Tier One / COAG process as a means of self-determination, the
perception of community-controlled organisations with a longstanding history
of involvement in the AP Lands (such as Nganampa Health Council and NPY
Women's Council) is that this process has shifted the focus away from
Anangu and how they do business.

These organisations suggest that in marrying
the APLIICC Tier One process to the COAG Trial, the intergovernmental
approach to addressing problems on the AP Lands has become increasingly
bureaucratic, impeding the possibility of responding effectively to substance
misuse and other issues. There are also continuing complaints about the
distance of bureaucrats from the AP Lands, their level of experience and
corporate knowledge in dealing with AP issues, especially those of volatile
substance misuse.^[67]

Community-controlled organisations claim
that better use could be made of their corporate knowledge and established
networks with the Anangu. The response from government officials to this
criticism is that APLIICC Tier One was limited to representation by key
executives from Indigenous organisations and government agencies in order
to be more streamlined in their processes.

The appropriateness of the APY executive
as an appropriate representative body for liaison with the Anangu communities
has also been raised as a matter of concern. At the Inquest, John Tregenza,
a consultant with a background in community development on the AP Lands,
commented that there was a general lack of understanding by government
about Anangu forms of representation. Whereas governments tend to identify
a boss for liaison and negotiations with a community, the concept of democratic
representation is alien to Anangu culture -- you represent yourself and
your family. Additional issues relate to the capacity of APY Executive
to represent Anangu on matters other than those relating to its traditional
core business, that of land management.

In his Review of delivery of services
to people with disabilities on Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands, Tregenza
articulates the case for extending representation beyond the networks
of the APY Executive to include those of other organisations as follows:

From time to time a misconception seems
to arise among policy-makers and funding agencies that AP [Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Executive] is the peak body in all matters. While it is true that AP
have responsibility for all matters relating to the administration of
the Lands on behalf of all the traditional owners of the lands (all
Anangu), responsibility for the delivery of many other services has
always been in the hands of other Anangu regional organisations.

The administrative structure on the AP
Lands does not parallel State or Commonwealth governments. AP is not
the 'parliament' and only decision making forum, and, every other service
organisation is not a department tof [sic] AP. AP Council is one of
a group of independent, community controlled organisations with their
own governing Boards of Management (Councils) elected by the same group
of traditional owners. Currently these organisations are Nganampa Health
Council (which came into existence at the same time as AP and well before
AP Services), NPY Women's Council (1980), Pitjantjatara Yangkuntjatjara
Education Council (PYEC). Each of the organisations was established,
and has a separate elected governing body, because Anangu considered
that the area covered by each was so complex that no single organisations
could do all the issues justice ....

It is therefore essential that any consultation
and discussions of issues with Anangu representatives from the Lands
must include representatives from all the Anangu community-controlled
organisations, and not just from AP Council and/or AP Services. Failure
to include all the stakeholders in the consultative, planning and decision-making
processes will only ensure the long term failure of regional programs
and projects.^[68]

The existence of serious governance and
service delivery issues in the Executive Board of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
and the Pitjantjatjara Council executive were also identified in a report
by Dr Mick Dodson. In August 2002 the Dodson Report found problems with
the administration of the Pitjantjatjara Lands Rights Act and the
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Board, with Dr Dodson observing that:

I think there are some serious governance
issues that need to be addressed. At the moment, it is my strong view
that the AP Executive Board is unrepresentative, undemocratic, unaccountable,
and seriously confused about its role and future role. I also have had
numerous anecdotal commentaries on the possible misuse of Board funds
to suggest at the very least it should be explored. From what I have
been told I suspect the problem is a systemic one ... ^[69]

The SA Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and
Reconciliation has since headed a Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry
into the Pitjantjatjara Lands Rights Act , with an administrator
now having been appointed to administer the Act. The APLLICC Tier One
Committee has also focused intensively on issues of governance and service
delivery with the APY Executive over the last twelve months. However,
Mr Tregenza's and Dr Dodson's comments would seem to corroborate concerns
about the capacity of the APY Executive to represent Anangu effectively
and the need to access broader networks of representation beyond its structures.

A further expressed concern is that government
is setting the communities up to fail, partly through over-reliance on
the APY Executive as a gateway, but more particularly through the expectation
that the communities should address their own problems, especially those
relating to volatile substance abuse. This is frequently framed not only
in the discourse of shared responsibility but also that of self-determination.
In their article recent article on the policy response to Indigenous petrol
sniffing in Australia, d'Abbs and Brady observe:

Central to these changes in the domain
of governing Indigenous Australians is the strategy of enlisting "communities"
to the work of governance. Under this strategy, Aboriginal communities
are expected to articulate desires and aspirations which are then taken
as authentic manifestations of "self-determination" - as long as they
accord more or less with what the state wants them to choose.^[70]

A kind of 'moral panic' has emerged in the emphasis on responsibility
in the public discourse on Indigenous policy and the expressed need for
Indigenous individuals and communities to address problems such as violence,
drug and alcohol abuse. This predominantly moral perspective has the effect
of narrowing the focus of Indigenous policy debate to obscure the broader
systemic factors contributing to the marginalisation and disadvantage
experienced by Indigenous families and communities.

It is undoubtedly empowering for individuals
and communities to exercise control over and to participate in finding
solutions to problems that threaten their security and survival. While
there is some evidence that strong governance in communities can have
a role to play in addressing substance abuse, as the success of zero tolerance
policies in petrol sniffing in communities such as Watarru and Ngaanyatjarra
indicates, there are limits to what good community governance can achieve.
The level of responsibility by government in providing services and resources,
particularly when there is an outstanding history of the failure to provide
access to services commensurate with the mainstream population, needs
careful evaluation.

In the case of volatile substance abuse
on the AP Lands, it seems problematic to suggest that the Anangu through
the auspices of the APY Executive (an organisation with a background in
land management), should assume responsibility for the carriage of programs
and services relating to problems such as the rehabilitation of sniffers
- that is, beyond consultation about and participation in determining
solutions to these problems. d'Abbs and Brady pose the following question:
'How, one must ask, can communities said to be wracked by disempowerment
and social deterioration be expected to "originate and control" actions
in response to petrol sniffing?' ^[71]

The Coronial Inquest emphasised the Anangu's
need for outside assistance in addressing issues of volatile substance
abuse, which has no precedent in their traditiional culture. At the inquest,
the father of Kunmanara Thompson likened the introduction of petrol sniffing
to the imposition of the Maralinga bomb tests:

There has been petrol sniffing since the
1950s. Who is responsible? The petrol doesn't belong to us. It is not
part of Anangu law. It was introduced to the Lands by white people.
It is important that Anangu revive their culture and hold on to their
culture. The problem with petrol comes from outside, it's like the Maralinga
bomb tests, the solution should come from the outside too.^[72]

As Dr Paul Torzillo, the Medical Director
of Nganampa Health Council, points out, mainstream communities with higher
living standards and more available services and resources would not be
expected to solve their own substance abuse problems:

[T]here seems to be a widespread view
within government ... that this is a problem which the community should
solve, this is their responsibility. This is a community with less resources
and ability to control a tough problem than any mainstream community ...
that's not a demand that's put on any other community in the country.
No-one, no politician and no bureaucracy expects that a suburb like
- so the people of Cabramatta are not told that they have to solve the
heroin problem and it's up to them to do it. No-one makes that demand
of them and they don't make that demand of them because it's a stupid
thing to do, it's clearly not possible.^[73]

The implicit danger of the current government
discourse on shared responsibility in Indigenous policy is that it will
not provide resources which are adequate or even commensurate with those
it provides to the non-Indigenous population in addressing the problems
surrounding volatile substance abuse.

• The bureaucratisation of community development?

There is a conflict of opinion about whether
these governmental and bureaucratic processes are appropriate for pursuing
self-determination on the AP Lands, and moreover, whether they might in
fact impede progress in petrol sniffing-related issues. It is sometimes
suggested that the government's current emphasis on capacity-building,
which is a feature of the COAG trials, merely amounts to the bureaucratisation
of what was formerly called community development.

One concern that has been commonly expressed
to HREOC is that the alliance with the COAG trial will merely contribute
to an unnecessary degree of bureaucratisation already implicit in the
APLIICC Tier One committee process and that an adequate response to the
Inquest might be overlooked in giving carriage to the business of the
COAG trial and the other priorities nominated for address on the AP Lands.

Despite these reservations about the bureaucratically
top-heavy way of doing business that capacity-building and inclusion in
the government's COAG trials might represent, there is also some optimism
that the involvement of the Commonwealth might be a source of greater
leverage to achieve some effective outcomes where the actions of states
and territories have been ineffectual in the past.

Responsibility for tackling petrol sniffing
lies across several government agency portfolios and as an issue, Indigenous
petrol sniffing has a tendency to fall through the gaps in public policy.
The COAG trial could have the capacity to make a more concentrated effort
in addressing the problems facing the AP Lands as a discrete area, and
provide greater impetus for Commonwealth and state governments to make
a coordinated and consolidated effort in addressing petrol sniffing. In
addition, the national spotlight of the COAG trials has the potential
to engender a greater degree of accountability from all levels of government.

b) Resourcing issues

There were three main areas of comment about
funding issues in the findings of the Coronial Inquest. The Coroner perceived
the need for a greater injection of funding and resources; funding of
programmes on a triennial basis, as recommended by the Royal Commission
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody; and the provision of funding for interventions
into petrol sniffing, including continued Commonwealth funding of the
Avgas initiative through the Comgas scheme (this final issue is discussed
in relation to health related issues later in this chapter).

• An inadequate level of resourcing

Information presented to the Coronial Inquest
indicated that the combined Commonwealth and State funding for the AP
Lands is:

approximately $60 million per year for
around 3,000 people of whom 2,500 are Anangu, making a per capita funding
rate of about $20,000 per year .... When the CDEP and Centrelink funds
($16 million) are excluded, the figure drops to around $15,000 per capita.^[74]

Very substantial increases in government
funding are required to deal with problems relating to remoteness, such
as access to mainstream services, and, more specifically in regard to
petrol sniffing, to achieve the continuum of care from prevention to treatment
and rehabilitation.

The issues surrounding Indigenous funding
needs, and equity and access to services particularly in remote areas
were canvassed by the Commonwealth Grants Commission's Report into
Indigenous Funding 2001 (the CGC Report). A significant aspect of
the terms of reference set by the federal government for the CGC Report
was an approach based on redistribution of funding according to the principle
of relative need (that is, between regions) as opposed to absolute need
(that is, in contrast to the rest of the population), with the intention
of considering redistribution of funds to favour remote areas. However,
the CGC's final report found that this approach was flawed in terms of
addressing the inequity in this area. It commented that:

Indigenous people in all regions have
high needs relative to the non-Indigenous population. An important question
is whether new methods of distribution should be applied to existing
programs and funds. Any change in methods of distributing existing resources
means that some regions would lose funding and others would gain. Large
redistributions risk losing the benefits of investments made over long
periods of time, including those in developing organisational capacity
and people. The real costs of redistribution may be high.^[75]

A further dimension of the funding issue
is the significant problem of accountability for service delivery to Indigenous
peoples which remains at the state and territory level. There is a longstanding
need for clear agreement among the states and the federal government about
their respective responsibilities to Indigenous peoples, how they will
act to meet these responsibilities and the resources to be committed by
all parties. The distribution of state and territory funds for Indigenous
service delivery is also the area where there exists the least transparency
and greatest cost shifting.

In July 2003 the South Australian government
announced a series of additional funding commitments totalling almost
$12 million over four years for initiatives on the AP Lands in its 2003-04
budget. In doing so, it 'acknowledged the longstanding social problems
created by petrol sniffing on the AP Lands ... and the recommendations of
Coroner Chivell's report.'^[76] The four main
areas of commitment are:

• $8.163 million over four years for Department of Health
  Services health and wellbeing initiatives that impact directly on petrol
  sniffing, and for regional office and respite initiatives;
• $1 million over four years for policing and justice initiatives
  on the Lands;
• $797,000 over four years to the Department of Aboriginal
  Affairs and Reconciliation for the introduction of legally licensed
  electrical operators; and
• $2 million over four years for the Department of Administration
  and Information Services to provide staff housing on the Lands.

Some of the questions that emerge from AP
Lands situation concern not only what would be a sufficient injection
of funds to address petrol sniffing and its attendant problems, but what
kind of funding arrangements, commitments and time-frames could be implemented,
in conjunction with the Commonwealth, to do so?

In an article that appeared earlier this
year in the Adelaide Review, Chris Charles commented that the findings
of the CGC Report could be used by the SA govt to secure a greater share
of per capita Commonwealth funding by highlighting the funding needs of
the Anangu.^[77] Working with an assumption
that the cost difference for delivering services to the AP Lands as a
whole will be greater than the 212% difference between NSW and the NT,
they put forward the following hypothetical calculation to support their
argument for greater funds for the AP Lands:

NT is dominated by Darwin and so lets
say delivery to remote areas such as the AP Lands is twice the difference,
translating to a dollar figure of $4890 per head. The relative capacity
to pay for these services can be estimated from data presented by Mr
Chivell which show that personal per capita income of Anangu people
is around $7000 per capita (mainly from CDEP, the Aboriginal peoples
work-for-the-dole scheme which provides $16 million to 2,500 people).
If we add to that some of the value of services delivered to the AP
Lands and already under Anangu control, we might double the per capita
income, making it 63% of the average South Australian income of about
$22000. When the adjustments are made, this comparison says that to
bring education, health, law and order and welfare of the 3000 people
on the AP Lands up to the standards the rest of us enjoy, we need to
spend at least $22 million more, each year, on an accrual basis. Of
course, before we spend the money a proper plan and an itemised costing
needs to be done but we know that more than the $12.4 million is justified
and that more than $12.4 million will be needed.^[78]

It appears that the current allocation of
funds by the South Australian and Commonwealth governments combined is
not enough to address the needs of the petrol sniffers in terms of intervention
and service delivery needs. The SA government's allocation of the $12.4
million will not be sufficient if it is to be a one-off allocation, and
continuous assessment of these funding issues is necessary in any future
budgetary arrangements in order to make inroads on the issues confronting
the AP Lands.

One interesting possibility raised by the
choice of the AP Lands as a COAG trial site is whether this may provide
leverage for negotiating a greater injection of funds in the future. While
the COAG Trials are not primarily a source of funding in themselves, the
emphasis on finding better ways for government agencies to work with Indigenous
communities, including improvement of service delivery coordination and
outcomes, should have the potential to negotiate more targeted funding
arrangements.

Another strategy might be the use of the
COAG trial to set and ensure compliance with performance conditions on
grants to states and territories (for example, specific purpose payments)
affecting service delivery to the AP Lands. Given that the COAG Trials
have the potential to support sustainable development in Indigenous communities,
they could also provide a forum for exploring the implementation of some
of the longer-term and more flexible funding arrangements recommended
by reports such as the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
and the Commonwealth Grants Commission.

• More flexible, long term funding arrangements

In 1991 the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody made recommendations for longer term, more flexible
forms of funding arrangements which would ensure increased Indigenous
participation. In particular, it recommended that Commonwealth, State
and Territory governments introduce triennial block grant funding for
Indigenous organisation, and that wherever possible this funding be allocated
through a single source with one set of audit and financial requirements
but with the maximum devolution of power to the communities and organisations
to determine the priorities for the allocation of such funds.

In part, Coroner Chivell's rationale for
recommending the funding of programmes on a triennial basis relates to
the difficulties of implementing bureaucratic parameters in a remote area:

Many of the people in the field complained
of the remoteness of bureaucracies, and their incessant demands for
written reports on performance outcomes and so forth. It would be better
if the bureaucracies appointed trusted representatives who could monitor
and evaluate projects and programmes for themselves, rather than insisting
that dedicated professionals in the field continue to spend valuable
time and resources preparing reports in order to ensure continued funding. ^[79]

The implementation of funding on a triennial
basis would also have greater potential to make significant inroads into
the problems surrounding petrol sniffing, an opportunity that is not available
within the pilot project funding paradigm.

The over-reliance of governments on pilot
project funding was singled out for particular criticism in the Coronial
Inquest. Anne Mosey, a community development consultant, observed that:

[C]ommunities were very tired of pilot
project funding. I think it is still pretty evident that there is still
a tendency for governments to rely on pilot project funding. Again,
because it is very difficult for them to access recurrent funding for
new positions, so the tendency is on government departments to be able
to put it in a pilot project because they are able to provide that kind
of funding a lot more readily, but they are not able to access recurrent
funding in terms of being able to provide ongoing support for that project,
so it falls over. It then takes x number of years to get the funding
up again, and, often state bureaucrats are as frustrated by that as
community organisations are. They would like to be able to provide recurrent
funding, they have a great deal of difficulty with the fact that they
are so constrained by budgetary processes and by their ... annual accountability
processes.'^[80]

Unreasonable expectations often accompany short-term funding
allocations such as pilot projects in Indigenous Affairs, particularly
in relation to a complex issue such as petrol sniffing. Torzillo comments:

[T]here is a widespread view that if
funds are expended the problem should be solved. That is, we gave you
people some money but petrol sniffing still exists, therefore you didn't
fulfil the requirements of the program. I mean, I'm not aware of any
reasonable government anywhere in the world who has that sort of expectation
in social policy elsewhere. No-one expects that funds expended on heroin
addiction in Australia will cease heroin addiction ... in fact, a consequence
of that is that when that doesn't happen there tends to be a response
from government that somehow the population has failed to deliver and
that sets up a hostile relationship between service agencies out here
and government, which is not a productive one if we are going to tackle
this problem.^[81]

In short, there is a need to give concerted
and focused attention to the issue of coordinating long-term funding arrangements
effectively at state and commonwealth government levels to engender the
necessary 'prompt, forthright, properly planned, properly funded action'
identified by the Coroner.

It is understandable if government departments
do not wish to commit to time-frames without appropriate consultation,
negotiation and the agreement of Anangu at this stage. However, there
remains a pressing need for a long-term commitment from governments to
address petrol sniffing on the AP Lands. Such a commitment needs to extend
beyond the government's four-year budget cycle, and include a time-frame
for progressing issues, including with projected outcomes that enable
equitable participation by Anangu and ensure the progressive realisation
of their rights. It is disturbing that there remains an absence of a clear
commitment from all levels of government to do whatever it takes to address
the endemic petrol sniffing issues on the AP Lands.

Community participation agreements, an initiative
introduced in the 2001 federal budget and administered by ATSIC, offer
much potential from a capacity-building perspective for achieving this.
They may ultimately provide the appropriate framework for locking down
government commitments alongside directions established by Anangu communities.
As I observed in the Social Justice Report 2001 about community
participation agreements:

Equitable participation by all partners
should be further reinforced by ensuring that the model is applied to
meet assessable goals and objectives over a prescribed time-frame ....
There would need to be clarity about what form of commitment various
partners are prepared to make, particularly in regard to the implementation
of the model over a period of time and the level of resources required,
and careful monitoring of all partners' participation as well as the
flexibility to make any necessary re-adjustments to the model.^[82]

A long-term framework would provide the
structure to ensure that the response to Indigenous petrol sniffing is
targeted and that adequate resources channelled within APLIICC Tier One
/ COAG process. Greater evaluation of the resourcing of the responses
by government is also necessary, and links should be developed with existing
knowledge bases and expertise on petrol sniffing to inform this. The COAG
Trial should also be viewed as an opportunity for piloting more flexible,
longer-term approaches to funding commitments, as recommended by both
RCIADIC and the CGC Report, and as a lever for increasing the level of
state accountability on service delivery to the AP Lands.

c) Health-related issues

Part of the South Australian government's
commitment to funding initiatives for the AP Lands over the next four
years included an allocation of $7 million to the Department of Health
Services (DHS) for health and wellbeing initiatives that will directly
impact on petrol sniffing and $1.163 million to provide regional office
and respite initiatives. $100,000 has been allocated to Nganampa Health
Council for supplementary funding for the patient transport scheme. Discussions
are currently taking place with key Anangu stakeholders and APY Land Council
representatives regarding preliminary proposals by the DHS for improving
primary health and safety. At the Shared Responsibility workshop in Alice
Springs, Anangu confirmed petrol sniffing programs, nutrition, child health
and safety as priority areas.

Representatives from government health departments
emphasised the degree of difficulty in responding to the health issues
surrounding petrol sniffing, given that the problem is multi-faceted and
has become entrenched over several decades. Quick-fix solutions are clearly
not possible, and interventions need to be progressed at several levels.
Importantly, the Coroner recommended the following to address this concern:

Recommendation 7: Many of the strategies
for combating petrol sniffing which have been tried in the past should
not be discarded simply because they failed to achieve permanent improvements.
Some of them might be regarded as having been successful for as long
as they were extant. For any strategy to be successful will require
broad Anangu support. Most strategies fail unless they are supported
by others as part of a multi-faceted approach. Strategies should be
aimed at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, as I have outlined
in these findings.^[83]

The three necessary levels of intervention
have the following goals:

• Primary interventions - to reduce recruitment
  into substance abuse (targeted at occasional and non-sniffers);
• Secondary interventions - to seek to achieve abstinence
  and rehabilitation (aimed at those who have been sniffing for some time
  and may be responsive to intervention); and
• Tertiary interventions - to provide services
  to the permanently disabled (chronic sniffers and those who may have
  sustained brain damage).^[84]

Forms of intervention that could be implemented at the various
levels include:

• Primary interventions - programs to reduce recruitment
  to sniffing, such as the provision of sports and recreation activities,
  and the employment of youthworkers;
• Secondary interventions - programs aimed at harm
  minimisation or cessation including policing, neuropsychological assessment,
  outstations/homelands, the Avgas scheme, legal sanctions, night patrols,
  programmes for children at risk, and crime prevention; and
• Tertiary interventions - disability services including
  hospital care, chelation therapy and custodial care.

Paul Torzillo has grouped petrol sniffers on the AP Lands
into the following three categories:

1. 25-40 year olds who are long-term chronic sniffers, often
   with sustained and irreversible damage, sociopathic tendencies and disability
   issues: disability services are the response to this issue;
2. an unknown number of young people established on sniffing
   who might be rehabilitated and need a mixture of interventions; and
3. new recruits who need sustained, long-term, flexible
   adaptable activities on an ongoing basis.^[85]

The view of the Nganampa Health Council
is that strong support is needed for both youth activities and disability
services. This section will examine the responses led by health agencies
to these areas of intervention against relevant recommendations by the
Coroner.

• Primary interventions

At the time of the Coroner's report, matters
on the agenda of the APLIICC Tier One Committee relating to petrol sniffing
on the AP Lands included the immediate placement of four youth-workers,
development of alternatives to incarceration for young offenders, and
residential disability services, all of which were highlighted for attention
in the Coronial recommendations

Recommendation 8.1 of the Coronial Inquest
was that the proposal before the APLIICC Tier One Committee to appoint
four youthworkers and a coordinator be implemented immediately. At the
time of the Inquest, there was $300,000 ($246,000 was recurrent) set aside
by the Aboriginal Service Division within the South Australia Department
of Human Services to fund these positions on the AP Lands, initially for
a period of twelve months. There have been complaints about the length
of time taken to implement this proposal of two-years standing from the
previous government, although an Anangu youthwork coordinator was appointed
in late 2003.

Some service providers see prevention of
the recruitment of new sniffers as the most crucial level of intervention
in avoiding escalation of the problem. They also argue that there is more
chance to make an intervention at an earlier age. Recruitment into petrol
sniffing is perceived to stem from the boredom and futility experienced
by young people in response to the degree of poverty and marginalisation
on the AP Lands.

The youthworker proposal has been seen as
the most substantial form of intervention at the level of primary intervention,
including as a basis from which to access other youth programs and funds
for Anangu and for the provision of after-school and holiday programs
and activities. However, there have been comments made about the lack
of adequate planning and consultation that preceded the proposal, as there
are issues about its implementation that required more careful thought.
For example, no real operational money has been provided to establish
a youth council or youth groups, or to set up an office. There have been
suggestions that some of the youthworkers be paid on a part-time or casual
basis via the CDEP scheme in order to free up some of the funding for
these purposes.

The basis of employment is another issue
in itself: part-time employment may suit Anangu youthworkers better (particularly
women), because of difficulties in factoring their other family and community
commitments within a standard 'nine to five' hour day. Other relevant
considerations include difficulties working with people from other moiety
systems, in travelling into other areas and sometimes also a lack of support
for women working beside their husbands. It has been suggested that funding
needs to be as local as possible, with a number of workers employed across
families on a part-time basis.

There is also a role for longer-term interventions,
such as case management. Potentially schools could play a role in terms
of working with youthworkers to provide preventative education programs
and resources for afterschool activities. If school counsellors were appointed,
there would be scope for them to liaise with youth-workers in managing
youth at risk where appropriate. Previously, community elders have provided
preventative activities, such as taking young people to herd camels or
to outstations, but it is hardly a role for which they can assume total
responsibility, given their range of other community commitment, including
dealing with chronic and disabled sniffers. The reliance on the CDEP Scheme
to support interventions such as youthworkers and night patrols is also
questionable, especially on a long-term basis, and proper funding for
part-time and casual positions and development of potential career pathways
should be considered.

• Secondary interventions

In accordance with recommendation 8.2 of
the Coronial Inquest regarding neurological assessment, an assessment
team with a multidisciplinary approach visited the lands and assessed
a group of people in terms of the extent of brain damage. In certain individuals,
there is no hope of reversing the effects of brain damage; the question
now is how to treat them. Options are being considered in terms of how
their counterparts in Adelaide would be treated and whether these options
would be appropriate in the AP Lands.

In relation to recommendation 8.3 of the
Coronial Inquest regarding the establishment of outstations/homelands,
the success of outstation programs such as Mt Theo near Yuendumu in providing
a 'venue for community respite, recreation, skills training education
and the like in the context of abstinence from petrol sniffing' was noted
by the Coroner.^[86] During the 1980s, homelands
were utilised with some success by community elders on the AP Lands in
running diversionary activities for petrol sniffers.

While they provide a significant avenue
through which community members can intervene in petrol sniffing and do
so in culturally-appropriate ways, they tend to be short-term measures
(a reflection of available funding), often personality-driven and difficult
to sustain as a long-term intervention. They are not suitable for dealing
with petrol sniffers with a high level of security or rehabilitation needs.
Outstations and homelands nevertheless provide a valuable option as a
harm minimisation strategy and have a place within a multi-faceted approach
to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands.

Recommendation 8.4 of the Coronial Inquest
calls for the continuation of Avgas (aviation fuel) under the Comgas scheme
as a successful harm minimisation strategy. Avgas is supplied to about
thirty Aboriginal communities under the Comgas Scheme administered under
the Commonwealth's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Substance Use
Program in the Department of Health and Ageing. The Scheme ensures that
communities using aviation fuel do so at no additional cost. Avgas is
not permitted otherwise for use in motor vehicles as it does not meet
several of the fuel specifications under the Fuel Quality Standards
Act 2000.

Data collected by Nganampa Health Council in the mid-1990s
demonstrates:

an unequivocal and marked reduction in
petrol sniffing as a consequence of the introduction of Avgas to all
communities. Not only was there a significant decline in the number
of petrol sniffers for the following three years but there seemed to
be a marked decline in fitting among petrol sniffers, probably as a
consequence of less frequent sniffing being possible because of limited
access to petrol.^[87]

The Avgas scheme is currently being evaluated.
It is anticipated that a successful application will be made for a continued
exemption under the Fuel Quality Standards Act 2000 before the
end of the 2003.

In relation to recommendation 8.8 of the
Coronial Inquest regarding the evaluation of the role of the Department
of Family and Youth Services (FAYS) in relation to children at risk, a
common statement from FAYS, teachers, and health service providers was
that just about every child on the AP Lands could be classified as 'at
risk'.

More specifically, the lack of employment
and education opportunities, and also of sport and recreation facilities
and other forms of entertainment and activity, are contributory factors
here. Although there is some opportunity to attend a boarding school near
Adelaide, there is little incentive to pursue an education or a career
on the AP Lands, and a perception that you can always get CDEP later [i.e.
The 'lifetime destination']. Afterschool employment of the kind available
to youth in mainstream communities (such as packing supermarket shelves)
is scarce, and there are limited career paths within service delivery
to the communities (for example, healthworker) and many of these positions
are filled by non-Indigenous people. A further aspect of this problem
is disability employment, the need to provide meaningful employment for
youth (and adults) with acquired brain damage from petrol sniffing.

In 26 March 2003 FAYS released Our Best
Investment: A State Plan to Protect and Advance the Interests of ºÚÁÏÇ鱨վ, the Report of the Review of Child Protection in South Australia, which
has a chapter on children and youth on the AP Lands. The Review endorses
the recommendations of the Coronial Inquest and urges that they be implemented
quickly.^[88]

Child intervention and protection is important
in regard to volatile substance abuse in terms of protecting children
at risk of self-harm or harm by others (such as violent or abusive behaviour
by sniffers or others). The current system for responding to children
at risk on the AP Lands requires the notifier to contact the Child Abuse
Report Line in Adelaide; it was asserted to the Review that in some cases,
there were as many as twenty-five notifications but no outcomes.^[89] Visits by FAYS workers to remote areas are infrequent, the caseload for
FAYS workers is high, and FAYS is seen as reluctant to use its statutory
authority in regard to child protection. There is a perceived need for
Anangu ownership and participation in the issue of child protection to
give FAYS' work credibility.^[90]

The Coronial Inquest recommended that FAYS'
role be expanded into one of proactive community development (and noted
in this context service delivery issues such as the need for early childhood
centres, after-school activities and holiday programs). Similar comments
that have been made in relation to other government agencies were also
made of FAYS, such as the lack of corporate knowledge, continuity of staff
and skilled workers addressing the issues on the AP Lands, their need
for a holistic, regional plan with planned outcomes, and the need to move
beyond pilot programs and inflexible service arrangements.

An issue specific to FAYS on the AP Lands
is that of child protection and intervention. It is said that FAYS is
often reluctant to act in cases of children at risk because of the history
of enforced removal, leaving children in situations of abuse and neglect.
It is also suggested that the desire to respond to the legislative requirement
that Indigenous children be placed within their own culture takes precedence
over the wellbeing of the child, as well as concerns about being seen
to satisfy the recommendations from Bringing them home. The situation
needs to be circumvented through consultation and participation with Anangu
in working out solutions for children at risk that may not involve removal
from families.^[91]

The Review states that FAYS has recognised
that levels of community education and community development with the
Aboriginal community has diminished over recent years, and that they could
take on key roles with Aboriginal families and communities in this regard,
particularly in developing programs that incorporate education and awareness
about child protection.^[92]

• Tertiary interventions

In relation to recommendation 8.10 of the
Coronial Inquest regarding the need to urgently upgrade services for disabled
victims of petrol sniffing, an appropriate response to the need for disability
services and facilities for petrol sniffers who have incurred a serious
degree of disability is currently under review. While the Coroner's report
recommends the establishment of secure care facilities with a potentially
multifunctional role that might include rehabilitation, the issue being
canvassed at present concerns the most appropriate model for treatment
and rehabilitation.

d'Abbs and Brady make the following comments
about the need to clarify whether elements of the mainstream paradigm,
such as the construction of rehabilitation facilities, are correct for
Indigenous petrol sniffers:

Calls from various community groups and
others for money to be allocated to residential rehabilitation facilities
for petrol sniffers owe more to a widespread faith in the efficacy of
this form of intervention than to any evidence supporting such faith.^[93]

There are a series of questions concerning
the location of the facility on the AP Lands, its potential long-term
use, its relevance to other groups of people at risk, and the necessary
level of security and its potential enforceability. The South Australian
Police and the Department for Correctional Services argue that rehabilitation
of disabled sniffers is not appropriate as a function of a secure care
facility as intensive personal care is needed, and that it is more appropriately
the province of health agencies and disability service providers.

Another suggestion has been the development
of disability services across the AP Lands, probably to be located at
six centres. The Review of delivery of services to people with disabilities
on Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands found support for the provision of
disability care in communities across the AP Lands:

• The Anangu preferred position is to have Anangu disability
  care workers based in their own communities supported and trained by
  a regionally based community controlled professional team.
• Given the situation in all the communities across the
  Lands, and while some communities may be able to deliver services in
  the short term, none are able to maintain effective and ongoing services
  to the aged and disabled. They do not have the infrastructure and resources
  nor capable, qualified and dedicated staff to deliver such services.
• While people may prefer to have everything delivered
  close to home, unless services are delivered by one of the regional
  agencies it is an impossible task. NPY Women's Council, Nganampa Health
  Council and AP Council through AP Services for housing and community
  infrastructure, are the current functional organisations.^[94]

Planning for the proposed petrol sniffing
rehabilitation facility is being led by DHS. As part of this planning
process, the CBRG has reached agreement on the terms of reference for
a feasibility study on different models for treatment. Letters of request
have been sent to health agencies (Commonwealth and state / territory
jurisdictions), and it is expected that the study will start by the end
of 2003 or in early 2004, and will be finalised by September 2004. Agreement
on the terms of reference has taken longer than expected because of the
number of stakeholders involved and the complexity of the issues. The
terms of reference include a survey of the available data on volatile
substance abuse, an analysis of the efficacy of available models of detoxification,
rehabilitation and treatment, and examination of what approaches are most
likely to be successful on the AP Lands.

A further consideration is the need for
consultation with communities at the local level to inform a regional
response, and the likelihood that different models may suit different
communities, requiring a more flexible approach to the issue. The feasibility
study is also seen to be of value in collecting data that will assist
in understanding the dimensions of the problem and in developing appropriate
responses to the situation. The findings of this study are to be fed back
to the CBRG, with the APY Executive to make the final decision over the
allocation for disability services.

d) Justice-related issues

In 2003 the APLIICC formed two new sub-committees
to review the Justice response to last year's Coroner's recommendations
and to more recent criticisms from Magistrate Hiskey who convenes the
court circuit on the AP Lands. The Department of Justice has allocated
$1 million over four years for policing and justice initiatives on the
AP Lands.

The justice issues that the Coroner identified as requiring
redress fall largely in the category of secondary interventions and relate
to:

• the range of sentencing options available to the courts
  sitting in the AP Lands (recommendation 8.5);
• amendment to the Public Intoxication Act (receommendation
  8.6);
• establishment of night patrols (recommendation 8.7);
• planning for the establishment of secure care facilities
  on the AP Lands (recommendation 8.10);
• implementation of the recommendations of the SAPOL review
  into the Community Constable Scheme, particularly the establishment
  of a permanent police presence (recommendation 8.12); and
• further measures by SAPOL to ensure that staffing at
  Marla is at full strength (recommendation 8.13).

Significant issues relate to the provision
of deterrence to petrol sniffing and some of the disruptive and harmful
behaviour that accompanies it, and the risks this behaviour presents to
both the individuals involved and to the rest of the community. This situation
could be alleviated through the provision of deterrence in the form of
a strengthened police presence in the area and the capacity for courts
to have a range of sentencing options and to direct court orders to higher-tariff
options.

Currently there are problems with providing
appropriate supervisors to implement community service orders or to direct
orders at rehabilitation facilities, as there is not an adequate level
of personnel or facilities. Without significant penalties and disincentives,
destructive behaviour continues, threatening community order and stability.
However, it is imperative that any justice measures be factored into an
overall, multi-faceted strategy: it is not the responsibility of the police
to compensate for the lack service delivery and infrastructure otherwise
available on the AP Lands. It has also been suggested that other service
providers sometimes use the lack of a police presence on the Lands as
an excuse for inadequate service provision.

The Coronial Inquest frames the lack of
security on the AP Lands specifically as a human rights concern. The Coroner
highlights the observations of Ann Mosey in this regard:

It seems to me that in the Lands there
is actually a human rights issue here. Everywhere else in Australia
communities are able to feel a certain level of security in the knowledge
that they have access to reasonably rapid police services, and the fact
that at a minimum it takes two hours for the police from Marla to get
to most communities, that is not including the ones that are a lot further
away, to me this is really an issue of basic human rights and not being
able to be accessed by the community members in the Lands, and I believe
they have a right to a range of government services in terms of say
health, education and so on and somewhere along the line there seems
to have been a decision made that they don't have the right to the protection
of the community itself from people who may be at risk of either harming
themselves or harming other people in the community ...^[95]

The United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and United Nations Development Programme has developed Draft
Guidelines on Poverty Alleviation, which incorporate existing human rights
standards on economic, social and cultural rights. These make particular
recommendations concerning the right to personal security which are especially
pertinent to the issue of access to police services and protection on
the AP Lands. Guideline 11: Right to Personal Security states that:

174. Poor people usually suffer from various forms of
insecurity. As well as experiencing financial, economic and social insecurity,
they are often homeless, marginalized, discriminated against and subject
to physical violence by State and non-State
actors. Accordingly, efforts to strengthen the right of poor people
to personal security shall have a crucial place in poverty reduction
strategies ...

178. Police protection should be provided
in poor areas particularly affected by violence, harassment, intimidation
and discrimination. Poverty reduction strategies should identify the
worst affected areas, such as slums, and provide them with a sufficient
number of specially trained law enforcement personnel.^[96]

In relation to recommendation 8.5 of the
Coronial Inquest regarding the availability on non-custodial options,
Court circuits are held on the AP Lands every two months where approximately
twenty to thirty good behaviour bonds are imposed. It is not possible
to make treatment orders or other orders directed at rehabilitation because
there are no facilities available. The maximum penalty for possessing
petrol for the purpose of inhalation is a $100 fine; by contrast, within
the Shire of Ngaanyatjarra (in Western Australia, under different state
legislation) fines up to $5,000 can be imposed.

Recommendation 8.5 stipulated that the 'SA
Department for Correctional Services must provide supervisors so that
bonds, undertakings and community service obligations can be enforced.'
Since the Coronial Inquest, the Department for Correctional Services has
increased the number of Community Correctional Officers servicing the
AP Lands by changing the operational boundaries of the Officer at Cooper
Pedy to complement the work already being carried out from Marla. There
are also plans for a mobile Community Service team to visit the AP Lands
three times a year, enabling greater opportunity for offenders to work
off their hours.

In August 2003 the main obstacle preventing
this initiative was lack of funding; it was only partly affordable under
internal reallocations. It is anticipated that these initiatives will
result in an increase of up to five Community Correctional Officers assigned
to duties on the AP Lands, culminating in a weekly presence from the beginning
of 2004.

The Department for Correctional Services
also emphasised the need for a multi-agency approach, highlighting the
need for community constables to play an increased role in collecting
offenders for supervision. They stressed that they were not necessarily
able to provide an appropriate level of supervision for offenders, particularly
in the case of chronic petrol sniffers:

People with severe petrol-sniffing behaviour
require a form of supervision more akin to attendant care, familiar
in the disability service system, than to the periodic supervision we
offer, hence the need for multi-agency based solutions.^[97]

The potential for these arrangements to
increase the range of options for sentencing, and to an appropriate level,
will need serious evaluation. Magistrate Hiskey, one of the two magistrates
on the court circuit for the AP Lands, recently expressed his frustration
with current arrangements in sentencing remarks relating to a twenty-seven
year old man charged with petrol sniffing.

In his comments in Police v Yakiti,
Magistrate Hiskey drew attention to the fact that while a bond with supervision
was the appropriate penalty, DCS was unable to offer appropriate supervision
and intervention services in such matters: 'The advice given to the court
by the department is not acceptable. This defendant, Casper Yakiti, deserves
the benefit of a supervised bond.'^[98]

He further observed that he was under obligation
'when sentencing offenders to impose whatever penalty is most appropriate
in law', and that the court expects and requires supervision to be provided
in this case and others where required.^[99] While neither the court or DCS could be held responsible for conditions
on the AP Lands, they were not absolved from implementing the recommendations.

In relation to recommendation 8.6 of the
Coronial Inquest regarding amending the Public Intoxication Act, the Coroner
recommended that the Public Intoxication Act 1984 be introduced
onto the AP Lands, with petrol and hydrocarbons recognised as drugs and
the police empowered to apprehend petrol sniffers, remove their petrol
cans and take them into custody. Some see this amendment as crucial intervention
in terms of deterrence and in offering families respite from sniffing.
They advocate that it should be implemented immediately, particularly
in light of the success of sanctions in the Shire of Ngaanyatjarra, where
petrol sniffing is an offence under local by-laws (the Aboriginal Communities
Act ^[100]). However, others query
the value of such legal sanctions in the absence of safe or adequate places
to hold sniffers, such as 'sobering up' places or a secure care facility.
At present, people can only be detained at the police lock-up. This is
not an appropriate option, especially following the findings and recommendations
of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. The availability
of an appropriate facility for drying-out would be significant in terms
of protecting the offender from harming themselves or other members of
the community.

In relation to recommendation 8.7 of the
Inquest regarding the establishment of night patrols and a crime prevention
strategy, the Inquest noted the success of night patrols in other communities.
While night patrols have been mooted for some time on the AP Lands as
a potential crime prevention strategy, they are yet to be implemented.
At the time of the Inquest, there was also no overall crime prevention
strategy for the AP Lands (the 'Office of Crime prevention' within the
Attorney General's Department and 'Crime Prevention Section' within SAPOL
are both responsible for addressing petrol sniffing) from which, for example,
night patrols could be coordinated. Since the Inquest, the Marla Action
Plan has been revisited as the basis for a crime prevention strategy.
Police officers have been assigned to work in partnership with individual
communities and Community Council to develop Community Safety action plans.
This is conceived as a long-term capacity-building exercise as well as
a community safety one, which to aims to build on community structures,
to enhance leadership and to engender a greater sense of responsibility
among community measures.

Support for the establishment of night patrols
has been offered by the police as part of this process, but to date, only
Mimili has shown an interest in this option. It should be noted that the
resources of the CDEP Scheme as well as the police can be deployed to
support such a program. The implementation of night patrols, however,
is dependent on the existence of commitment and capacity in the communities
to such a program.

In relation to recommendation 8.10 regarding
the establishment of secure care facilities on the AP Lands, the Tri-Jurisdictional
Justice Group is considering the Coroner's recommendation. They have acknowledged
that the Northern Territory government is building a new prison in Darwin.
More appropriate to the AP Lands, however, are the existing medium to
low term facilities at Alice Springs. While this option is closer than
the Port Augusta prison, it still may not be close enough to obviate concerns
expressed by Anangu about the distance of offenders from family and the
potential for offenders to re-offend on their release or to become itinerants.
Once again, those working in the justice area express concern about dealing
with offenders with rehabilitative needs, and while the Tier 2 committee
originally discussed the development of a bilateral bid for a co-located
DCS/SAPOL facility to service the AP Lands, this has been shelved in respect
to the DHS-led discussions of a feasibility study of rehabilitation services.

The ALRM has commented on the situation
as follows:

It is of concern for instance that the
latest 2003-4 budget bids have not included provision for a small correctional
facility on or near the APY Lands, of the kind that was recommended
by the Coroner. ALRM understands that budget bids for such a facility
have not been made or have not been successful for the last several
years, because of lack of necessary provision in recurrent funding.
If the State of South Australia does not have the necessary resources,
outstanding needs should be identified and met by the Commonwealth,
perhaps through specific purpose payments in the areas of health, housing
infrastructure and education.^[101]

In regard to the Coroner's recommendations
on the implementation of the recommendations of the SAPOL review into
the Community Constable Scheme, particularly the establishment of a permanent
police presence on the AP Lands (recommendation 8.12) and further measures
by SAPOL to ensure that staffing at Marla is at full strength (recommendation
8.13), there is no permanent police presence on the AP Lands. Historically,
the AP Lands have been policed from Oodnadatta and are now policed from
Marla. It is difficult to police the Lands effectively from this town,
which is situated just outside the border as 'in good conditions it can
take six to seven hours to travel from Marla to Pipalyatyara or Watarru
communities, and in adverse conditions it may not be possible to get through
at all.'^[102]

The community constable scheme was introduced
in the late 1980s and early 1990s to employ local Anangu as police aides,
and in doing so, increase the police presence. There are now Community
Constables in each of the major communities who are supervised by the
police at Marla (twelve positions) - but 'no sworn police officers stationed
to support, train and supervise them.'^[103] The Coroner recommended that non-Anangu police officers be reintroduced
into the AP Lands, as there are cultural problems with Community Constables:
'if a Community Constable had [a] difficulty with a family member in his
community, then a Community Constable from another community might be
called upon, or mainstream police may come in and try to handle the situation.'^[104] The Coroner stated that:

It seems to me that to rely on Aboriginal
police officers in communities is a great failure of the South Australian
government to provide those sort of services to people on the Lands
and I think that at the very least there needs to be a well equipped
police station with say protective custody facilities in it which would
be possibly placed either at Umuwa or one of the other major communities
and it may be that there needs to be two or three police stations set
up and they need to be provided with adequate staffing levels so that
the police themselves feel that they are able to carry out their duties
and that they feel safe and that their families feel safe in the environment
that they are in.^[105]

In addition, the Coroner noted the positive
effects of the short but targeted Operation Pitulu Wantima, run
during January to February 2002, where sniffers were to be identified,
and where possible, the contents of their cans emptied and crushed. The
operation involved the presence of four police officers, together with
all the community constables, every day. The report found that the community
response to the operation was largely positive and that sniffers became
more cooperative over time.

Communities appreciated the increased
police presence and communicated that their needs were better addressed.
This manifested in an increase in inquiries made to police and resulted
in some officers completing very lengthy shifts ...

This information suggests that there is
considerable under-reporting of crime on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands
when police are not so available. The additional police officers deployed
resulted in improved reporting of crimes which were resolved usually
straight away. Response times improved and Community Constables performed
at a higher level with the support they received from the additional
patrols. Break-ins continued to occur, but the incidence of these crimes
lessened, as did the incidence of violent crimes normally attributed
to petrol induced rages.^[106]

Since the Inquest, the South Australian
Police Department (SAPOL) has implemented Operation Safe Lands, which
is aimed at increasing police presence, improving safety and reducing
public disorder on the AP Lands. The operation, which initially ran from
October 2002 to January 2003, has recommenced and will run until June
2004 as an interim measure pending the implementation of a longer term
strategy. Operation Safelands involved bringing five officers on to the
AP Lands for discrete periods of time to make a concentrated effort in
targeting problems such as violence, theft, cannabis use and petrol sniffing,
and develop a greater intelligence base regarding crime prevention.

A further initiative has been SAPOL's partnership
with NPY Women's Council targeting family violence on the AP Lands. At
the time of the Inquest, the Coroner noted that there was very little
protection under existing arrangements, for example, for community members
who might be the subjects of violence as a result of substance-abuse related
behaviour, because of the prohibitive distances the police had to travel.
As a result, police response times to violence and other issues had improved,
and it has been agreed that the partnership should be adopted on a permanent
basis.

In 1998 a review of the Community Constable
Scheme recommended that two officers be stationed at Umuwa and a further
two at another centre on the AP Lands. In late August 2003 the provision
of two extra police officers per week was facilitated through the Marla
Support Plan; under these arrangements, the extra police are rotated through
Marla to patrol the Lands for week-long blocks. This is an interim arrangement
and there is general agreement with the Review of the Community Constable
Scheme that a minimum of four, maybe six, police officers need to be permanently
stationed in the Lands, two operating out of Umuwa and at least two out
of another community centre. Discussions are under way concerning the
infrastructure and housing needs for stationing the officers. The possibility
of establishing multi-jurisdictional facilities on the AP Lands has also
been discussed by the Tri-State Jurisdictional Justice Group.

While communities express some frustration
with the 'stop/start' nature of police interventions over the past two
years, there is also optimism that these initiatives will lay the basis
for a long-term police presence and will increase the capacity of communities
to provide a safe environment for their members.

e) Summary of key issues and concerns in responding
to the Coronial Inquest and petrol sniffing on the AP Lands

In summary, the Coronial Inquest has identified
the need for 'prompt, forthright, properly planned, properly funded action'
and the importance of effective inter-governmental coordination to achieve
this and sustain it into the longer term. In the year since the Coronial
Inquest, there has been some movement in this direction but overall not
enough.

There is no lack of inter-departmental and
inter-governmental forums for tackling issues relating to petrol sniffing,
with the existence over the past few years of the APLIICC (Tier One Committee
and Task Forces), CBRG, Petrol Sniffing Task Force (now submerged within
APLIICC Tier One Committee) and Tri-Jurisdictional Justice Group. The
COAG whole of government community trial is also now super-imposed over
these structures.

There have been some positive initiatives
emerging from these committees, such as the agreement to conduct a study
of demographics on the AP Lands and to explore coordination and sharing
of facilities and programs across the NT, SA and WA; the creation of an
Office of the APY Lands within the South Australian Indigenous affairs
department; the allocation of additional funding by the SA government
to address related issues on the AP Lands; and the creation of an Allocation
Committee to coordinate funding on the AP Lands. The decision to conduct
the COAG trial on the AP Lands is also a positive acknowledgement of the
urgent needs of the area and of the importance of governments changing
the way they work with the Anangu.

The establishment of these committees has
also been met favourably by communities on the AP Lands in general. However,
communities on the AP Lands have expressed concerns about the continuing
piecemeal approach to petrol sniffing and a reluctance to act by governments
in the twelve months following the Coronial Inquest. Governments cite
the intractable nature of the issue and the need for appropriate consultation
as reasons for the slow progress to date.

There is significant concern that the discrete
focus on petrol sniffing is potentially being obscured by the level of
bureaucracy. There is concern that petrol sniffing will be submerged within
a sea of other significant issues and not receive the focussed attention
called for by the Coronial Inquest and communities on the AP Lands.

Concerns that have emerged in the initial
twelve months since the Coronial Inquest include that the COAG trial might,
in the name of being more 'streamlined', in fact be distancing key representative
bodies on the AP Lands from service delivery and decision making as it
relates to substance misuse. This is particularly due to concerns about
the over-reliance on the APY Executive as the 'gateway' and peak body
representing all Anangu interests. This seems to extend beyond its community
acceptance and expertise. Significant concerns about its corporate governance
and service delivery performance have also been raised as related concerns.

There are also concerns that the emphasis
of the COAG Trial and these processes on community ownership obscures
the bigger picture of a lack of adequate and appropriate service delivery
and funding. The expectations that appear to be placed on the APY Executive
to take carriage and responsibility for issues, beyond coordinating consultations
and participating in priority setting, is indicative of this. The Coronial
Inquest makes clear the need for outside assistance and improved government
performance. This may be being obscured by the emphasis on joint responsibility.

There is also, however, optimism that the
COAG trial may ultimately breakthrough and achieve improved inter-governmental
and inter-agency coordination where it has not been achieved in the past,
and that it may result in greater accountability for all levels of government.
There is also hope that the involvement of the Commonwealth may also provide
greater leverage and ultimately achieve more effective outcomes. It is,
however, too early to say whether these potential benefits will be realised.

A barrier to achieving such results remains
the clear under-resourcing of service delivery on the AP Lands. The allocation
of nearly $12 million by the SA government specifically to petrol sniffing
related issues over the next 4 years is a welcome announcement. Concerns
have been expressed that this quantum may not be enough. There is a need
for ongoing assessment of the resourcing need, and for funding to be ongoing
beyond the 4 year budget cycle. In particular, there is concern at the
failure to date to fund projects beyond the pilot stage. The Coroner's
suggestion of moving to block funding on a triennial basis is aimed to
addressing this concern.

It remains of great concern that alongside
the establishment of the various committees and inter-governmental forums,
there is no clear, long term commitment to do whatever it takes to overcome
the petrol sniffing problem or movement towards establishing benchmarks
and targets towards this end. It may be that the Commonwealth government's
community participation agreement process (coordinated by ATSIC) may provide
a way forward in this regard.

At a practical level, there has been variable
progress in implementing initiatives at the primary, secondary and tertiary
intervention stages, relating to both health and justice issues. There
have been practical problems in placing youth-workers and a youth work
coordinator, with differing views as to the potential role of the CDEP
scheme, where such workers are placed and whether more part time appointments
would be more appropriate to the needs of communities. Significant issues
relating to homelands / outstations, a changed approach to child protection
issues and the provision of appropriate disability services and a secure
care facility for offenders remain under consideration or subject to feasibility
studies.

There have been positive developments relating
to service delivery with an increased presence of correctional services
officers, police and expansion of the community constable scheme as an
interim measure. This has resulted in an improved response time from police.
These issues require much greater attention, but there is greater optimism
about the ability of police to have a more effective presence on the AP
Lands, with consequent benefits for community safety.

The police continue, however, to face pressures
of being heavily relied upon in the absence of other necessary forms of
service delivery. Overall, there also remains a significant challenge
of balancing law and order responses with adequate provision of services,
particularly those which are health related. The dilemma relating to the
proposed application of the Public Intoxification Act, in absence of detoxification
and other support services, is an example of this ongoing, longer term
problem.

Conclusion - a blueprint for action

When Australia appeared before the United
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2000,
the committee's country rapporteur made the following comments and asked
the following question:

I think we all have to welcome the increase
in government resources going into what seem to be a multiplicity of
programs and activities to address the social and economic disadvantage
within the Aboriginal community ...

Now I note that you said today that there's
been great improvement over a short period of time, and I'm sure there
has been, but you know it's interesting to me, and again I will say
this because I come from a country myself where there is a disadvantaged
community and a lot of government programs et cetera, it's of serious
concern the extent of the dramatic inequalities that are still being
experienced by these population groups when they represent only, you
know, no more than 2% of the population of a highly developed, industrialised
state, and ... it makes me wonder about things like the effectiveness
of the programs, monitoring, benchmarking, what are the standards, is
anybody watching this to see whether or not they really are designed
to meet the disadvantages that are real in the communities, you know
the real history of systemic discrimination, institutional racism?^[107]

The same questions could be posed in relation
to the issue of petrol sniffing on the AP Lands and the underlying socio-economic
circumstances. Namely, given the smallness of the Anangu population, and
the proportion of petrol sniffers within it, why has there been so little
progress in addressing these problems, despite the plethora of governmental
service delivery agencies and committees already in existence? Magistrate
Hiskey recently put this issue more directly: 'People cannot be allowed
to die when intervention and assistance may save them. The communities
upon the Pitjantjatjara lands need assistance.'^[108]

Given the history of neglect of petrol sniffing
and its attendant problems on the AP Lands, the Coronial Inquest has provided
an opportunity to focus on these issues. They should not be allowed, like
the recommendations of so many other reports, to drift away unheeded.
Instead, Coroner Chivell's recommendations should be capitalised on as
the basis for a blueprint for a long-term sustained, comprehensive strategic
plan for tackling these issues - even if some aspects of his recommendations
are ultimately superseded by better alternatives decided at the local
level.

The issue of addressing Indigenous petrol
sniffing on the AP Lands should be recognised in terms of the specific
challenge it presents to governments and bureaucracy in terms of changing
the way in which they do business with communities and in developing effective
whole-of-government approaches. The designation of the AP Lands as a COAG
Trial adds particular impetus to this challenge for governments to show
that they are genuine about reforming their relationship to communities.

The uncomfortable question which Indigenous
petrol sniffing on the AP Lands raises is whether the structures of bureaucracy
and the ways governments do business need to be radically altered: if
not, will serious human rights issues such as petrol sniffing confronting
Indigenous people keep on falling through the cracks? d'Abbs and Brady
comment as follows on the respective level of responsibilities on both
sides of the government and community partnership: '[W]hile communities
must be partners in any program to address petrol sniffing, the notion
that government agencies can sit back and insist that communities take
"ownership" of the problem, and that all governments need to do is provide
intermittent project grants to community groups, needs to be exposed and
rejected.'^[109]

HREOC has advocated a progressive realisation
approach in which incremental steps are taken to address aspects of Indigenous
disadvantage with a specified time-frame. Most of the responses to the
Coroner's recommendations in the past year have been both thoughtfully
considered and incremental. The series of interventions that the Coroner
has advocated target all levels of the problem, from potential through
to chronic sniffers, and from precipitating causes through to situational
and underlying factors. However, in order to keep the momentum of the
response to Coronial recommendations going, there needs to be long-term,
bipartisan agreements put in place in regard to Indigenous petrol sniffing
that will withstand changes in governments and bureaucracies, their agendas
and personnel. Attention also needs to be given to developing the capacity
of people across all sectors - government, NGO and communities - to address
petrol sniffing-related problems on the AP Lands. Capacity-building of
this nature must necessarily be allied to the development of evidence
bases relevant to petrol and other inhalants, including strategic approaches
and best practice examples, so that a corporate knowledge base can be
maintained. Frameworks for progressing a long-term strategic plan for
eradicating petrol sniffing must also be negotiated in consultation with
the Anangu.

Given the limits on information which exists
in relation to petrol sniffing and other substance misuse problems in
Indigenous communities, the AP Lands situation also presents a significant
opportunity to road-test strategies and solutions that may be applicable
to other regions of Australia. Of particular interest are the models and
the implications for Indigenous Australia that might emerge from the meeting
of petrol sniffing as a public policy issue and the COAG trial as an interagency,
inter-community challenge. Whether such initiatives as the COAG whole-of
government trials ultimately prove to be more of a hindrance, obscuring
and obstructing an effective response to issues such as Indigenous petrol
sniffing, or whether its role might be pivotal in reforming service delivery
at the Commonwealth and state level is a question that remains to be answered.

1. It is a custom of the
Anangu people to avoid using the first name of the deceased during the
period of mourning. Instead, the Pitjantjjatjara word 'Kunmanara' is used.

2. Chivell, W, Findings of
the South Australian State Coronial Inquest into the Deaths of Kunmanara
Ken, Kunmanara Hunt and Kunmanara Thompson, 6 September 2002, .

3. ibid, p2. .

4. ibid, p2. .

5. Western Australian Task Force
on Drug Abuse 1995, quoted in Parliament of Victoria, Drugs and Crime
Prevention Committee, Inquiry into the inhalation of volatile substances:
Final report, DCPC, Parliament of Victoria, Melbourne 2002, fn 156,
p139. .

6. Chivell, W, op.cit, p4.

7. Legislative Assembly of the
Northern Territory, Select Committee on Substance Abuse in the Community, Interim report of the committee to date - issues of alcohol abuse,
cannabis use and inhalant abuse, Parliament of the Northern Territory,
Darwin 2003, p13.

8. Chivell, W, op.cit, p14.
In an internet forum on petrol sniffing Andrea Mason argued that 'many
AP communities experiencing problems with petrol sniffers experience a
kind of cultural suffocation. Petrol sniffers are slowly but surely suffocating
and snuffing out the cultural vitality and cultural norms and traditional
authority structures in their communities. They incite violence and inflict
pain for purely selfish gain'. The Australian, Online Forum, 25
November 2001, , accessed 29 July 2003.

9. Brady, M, Heavy Metal: the Social
Meaning of Petrol Sniffing in Australia, AIATSIS, Canberra, 1989,
p10.

10. South Australian Coroners Court,
Pitjantjatjara Lands, Before Mr W Chivell - State Coroner, Inquest
into the Deaths of Kunamanara Ken, Kunmanara Hunt and Kunmanara Thompson,
Transcript of Proceedings, No.11/2002,. Inyika XN (Mr Goetz), p309.

11. Chivell, W, op.cit, p2.

12. Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament of
Australia, Canberra, October 2003, pxiv, Recommendation 20.

13. ibid, pp135-6.

14. ALRM, 'Supplementary submission
of Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement Inc, Adelaide,' Australian Senate
Legal and Constitutional References Committee Inquiry on Progress Towards
National Reconciliation, 24 June 2003, p14.

15. House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Road to recovery: Report
on the inquiry into substance abuse in Australian communities, Parliament
of Australia, Canberra 2003, pp 198-199.

16. ibid, Recommendation 71,
p200.

17. d'Abbs, P, and Brady, M, 'Other
drugs, other people, other places: the policy response to Indigenous petrol
sniffing in Australia', Conference paper, Inhalant Use and Disorder Conference,
Australian Institute of Criminology, Townsville, 7-8 July 2003, p2.

18. ibid, p6.

19. ibid., p10.

20. Torzillo, P, 'Petrol sniffing
on the AP Lands: Report to the Coroner', Nganampa Health Council, 2002,
p11.

21. Parliament of Victoria, op.cit.,
pp139-140.

22. ibid, pp137, 139.

23. James, M, Petrol sniffing
on Cape York Peninsula,

,
accessed 20 November 2003, p1.

24. Queensland Government, Kainedbiipitli
- A new dawn. Torres Strait Island crime prevention resource manual,
online at: , accessed 20 November
2003.

25. ABC Online News, 'Government
agencies promise schemes to fight petrol sniffing', 30 September 2003, , accessed 20 November 2003.

26. Ngaanyatjarraku community, Law
and justice submission to the Attorney-General of Western Australia,
Shire of Ngaanyatjarraku, Kalgoorlie, April 2002, p1.

27. Legislative Assembly of the Northern
Territory, op.cit., pp12-13. There are also communities that have
overcome significant petrol sniffing problems in recent years, such as
Yuendumu: see further, Siegel, N, 'The interaction between petrol sniffers
and bush court in Aboriginal communities', Conference paper, Inhalant
Use and Disorder Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology, Townsville,
7-8 July 2003.

28. Parliament of Victoria, op.cit,
pp138-139.

29. Australian National Council on
Drugs, Structural determinants of youth drug use, ANCD Canberra
2001, cited in Parliament of Victoria, Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee,ibid,
p140.

30. Brady, M, op.cit, p14.

31. d'Abbs, P, and Brady, M, op.cit,
p3.

32. ibid, p4.

33. ibid, p5.

34. ibid.

35. Ibid, p9.

36. ibid, p10.

37. Agencies and Departments included
the Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health (Cth); Department
of Correctional Services (SA); Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation,
SA; Department of Human Services (SA); South Australian Police (SAPOL);
and the Sheriff's Office.

38. Including the Aboriginal Legal
Rights Movement; Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women's
Council; Ngannyatjarra Council Aboriginal Corporation; and Nganampa Health
Council.

39. Including at Fregon, Waturra,
Wantinna Homestead and Warburton.

40. In fact, one of the first
events that I attended as Social Justice Commissioner was a conference
convened in Alice Springs in 1999 to discuss the use of aviation gas as
a substitute for petrol in order to address the problem of sniffing on
the AP Lands. See further: NPY Women's Council, AVGas / COMGas conference,
28-39 July 1999, Alice Springs.

41. ALRM, op.cit, p17.

42. Ibid, p15.

43. Torzillo, P, op.cit, p9.

44. See for example: Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice
Report 2002, HREOC Sydney 2002, Chapter 4.

45. Maggie Cavanagh, former coordinator
of the Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women's Council in
evidence at the Coronial Inquest. Quoted in Chivell, W, op.cit, p32.

46. ibid., p1.

47. Torzillo, P, 'Petrol sniffing
on the AP Lands: Report to the Coroner', Nganampa Health Council, 2002,
p2.

48. Ibid.

49. ibid, p2.

50. Chivell, W, op.cit, p1.

51. ibid, Recommendation 1,
p65.

52. ibid.

53. Note: This analysis of the adequacy
of response to the Coronial recommendations includes processes or initiatives
that may not have been developed or undertaken by governments directly
in response to the Coronial recommendations.

54. Chivell, W, op.cit, pp32-3.

55. ibid, p64.

56. Ibid.

57. See, for example: Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice
Report 2001, HREOC Sydney 2001, Chapter 3.

58. Chivell, W, op.cit, p64.

59. Ibid, pp32-3,.

60. ibid, p23.

61. Ruddock, P, (Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), Patterson, K, (Minister
for Health and Ageing), Roberts, T, (SA Minister for Aboriginal Affairs
and Reconciliation) and Lewis, G, 'Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) Lands Communities
to Work Together with Federal-State Partnership', Joint media release,
22 May 2003, p1.

62. Chivell, op.cit,
p64.

63. Roberts, T, 'Re: South Australian
Government response to the findings of the State Coronial Inquest into
the deaths of Kunmanara Ken, Kunmanara Hunt and Kunmanara Thompson', Correspondence
to HREOC, 14 November 2003, p4.

64. Indigenous Communities Coordination
Taskforce, Towards better outcomes for Indigenous Australians,
DIMIA Canberra 2003, http://www.icc.gov.au/publications?

MySourceSession=6c1193 61b7d1a3a6cffc8b581a0eba82, accessed 15 November
2003.

65. Chivell, op.cit, p31.

66. Ruddock, P, op.cit, p2.

67. For example, the convening of
the COAG 'Shared Responsibility' workshop in Alice Springs, rather than
on the AP Lands, and the venue's proximity to the casino was cited by
some as highly inappropriate.

68. Tregenza, J, Review of delivery
of services to people with disabilities on Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands
- an Anangu perspective, SA Department of Human Services, Adelaide
2002, pp35-6.

69. Dodson, Dr M, cited in Roberts,
T, 'Report reveals serious problems in Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands: Minister
welcomes parliamentary inquiry', media release, 29 August 2002.

70. d'Abbs, P, and Brady, M, op.cit, p7.

71. ibid, p8.

72. Chivell, W, op.cit,
p20.

73. Ibid, pp23-4.

74. ibid, p23.

75. Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous funding, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra
2001, p xvii.

76. Roberts, T, 'State government
action on petrol sniffing', Media release, 23 July 2003.

77. Quoted in Chapman, P, 'The budget
for petrol sniffing' (2003) 238 Adelaide Review 3, p4.

78. ibid.

79. Chivell, W, op.cit, p3.

80. Ibid, pp30-1.

81. Ibid, p31.

82. Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001, HREOC, Sydney, 2001, p89.

83. Chivell, W, op.cit, p66.

84. ibid, p50.

85. Torzillo, P, op.cit, p3.

86. Chivell, W, op.cit, p65.

87. Torzillo, P, op.cit, pp3-4.

88. Layton QC, R, Our best investment:
A state plan to protect and advance the interests of children, Government
of South Australia: the Review of Child Protection in South Australia,
23 March 2003, /our-work/commission-general/broken-link?childprotection+publications,
para 8.35.

89. Ibid, para 8.34.

90. ibid.

91. ibid.

92. ibid.

93. d'Abbs, P, and Brady, W, op.cit,
p5.

94. Tregenza, J, op.cit, p37.

95. Chivell, W, op.cit, p62.

96. United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and United Nations Development Programme, Draft Guidelines:
A Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, UNHCHR
Geneva 2002, ,
accessed 15 November 2002, paras 174, 178.

97. Severin, P, Chief Executive,
Department for Correctional Services, 'Re: Findings of the State Coronial
Inquest into the Deaths of Kunmanarra Ken, Kunmanarra Hunt and Kunmanarra
Thompson', Correspondence with HREOC, 20 August 2003, p2.

98. Hiskey, G, Police v Yakiti,
cited in '"These people can't be allowed to die": Magistrate speaks out
on petrol sniffing', Koori Mail, 30 July 2003, p5.

99. Ibid.

100. Offenders can be fined up to
$5,000 under the Act. Similarly, under the Young Offenders Act children
can be ordered to do community service activity or required to go at a
community substance abuse facility for up to one week. There is, however,
criticism of changes to sentencing legislation from 1995 which meant that
the option of sentencing offenders for up to three months in a rehabilitation
centre was no longer available has seriously undermined the success of
addressing petrol sniffing problems: See further, Shire of Ngaanyatjarra, op.cit.

101. ALRM, op.cit, p17.

102. Chivell, W, op.cit, p51.

103. Ibid, p53.

104. Ibid, p54.

105. Ibid, p60.

106. Ibid, p59.

107. McDougall, G, CERD Transcript
21-22 March 2000, 1393rd meeting, Part II, p4; quoted in Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice
Report 2000, HREOC Sydney 2000, p58.

108. Cited in '"These people
can't be allowed to die": Magistrate Speaks out on petrol sniffing', op.cit.

109. d'Abbs, P, and Brady,
W, op.cit, p12.